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Abstract:
This thesis examines domestic authorities’ use of non-criminal justice responses1 to
counter organized crime. Examples of responses used to counter outlaw motorcycle2 gangs in
Canada, Germany, and Iceland are provided. These responses are significantly different from
most international efforts focusing on criminal norms and cooperation in criminal matters.

1

For the purpose of this work, the term ‘non-criminal justice responses’ will be used in accordance with the
following definition:
non-criminal justice responses are neither intended to bring about criminal punishment, nor to carry out any criminal
punishment. However, failing to comply with these responses or conditions laid out by them, might bring about
criminal liability, without such criminal sanctions being the purpose of these responses as such. Therefor, noncriminal justice response might have one or more institution of the criminal justice system as part of the process,
(such as police, prosecution, etc.) or be entirely initiated, executed and controlled by such institutions. However, the
actions taken are neither based on the criminal law nor legislations intended to bring about or execute criminal
sanctions.
An example would be the check stops in Canada, where the police sets up check stops based on the traffic law and
apparently to collect intelligence about individuals suspected of being involved in organized crime. Therefore, these
efforts are neither based on the criminal law, nor intended to bring about prosecution for any particular offence
under the criminal law.
Another example would be the civil law orders in Australia, where known members of declared outlaw motorcycle
can be issued a control order, restricting their ability to associate, take on particular occupation or stay in particular
location. Non compliance with these control orders bring criminal sanctions, without though the criminal sanctions
being the main purpose of the orders, but rather to reinforce the preventive control orders.
Consequently, the term ‘non-criminal justice responses’ excludes both ‘criminal law responses’ and ‘criminal justice
responses’. This study has found there to be a confusion in the use of the terms ‘criminal law responses’ and
criminal justice response, for the sake of clarity, this work will rely on the following use of these terms:
‘Criminal Law Responses’ are only those responses that are based directly on the Criminal Law.
‘Criminal justice responses’, include criminal law responses, but additionally, include all the responses utilized by
the criminal justice system for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law. These could be actions taken by
authorities, such as detention and arrest for investigative purposes, search and seizure, etc. (potentially based on
parts of the criminal procedural law, law about the judiciary, policing acts, etc.) Additionally, responses intended to
execute sanctions, by bringing about and manage the punishment that has been decided (potentially based on laws
and regulations governing payment of fines, incarceration, disposal of criminally forfeited assets, etc.) These
responses are generally based on legislations intended for the purpose of upholding the criminal law, to bring about
punitive actions of the criminal law, and for the management of any punitive actions.
2
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCG) is a form of organized crime, known for utilizing intimidation and violence to
further the gang’s interests. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs originate from the motorcycle culture of Northern America
after the Second World War, but have increasingly become involved in ever more sophisticated forms of organized
crime, including drug trafficking, prostitution and extortion. Outlaw motorcycle gangs are distinctive from many
other forms of organized crime in that member generally do not hide their involvement with the gang, in fact
members generally wear insignia on their clothing that indicates their involvement with the gang.
See for example: Quinn, James F, ‘angels, bandidos, outlaws, and pagans: the evolution of organized crime among
the big four 1% motorcycle clubs’ (2001) 22 Deviant Behavior, 379; Barker, Tom, ‘American Based Biker Gangs:
International Organized Crime’ (2011) 36 American Journal of Criminal Justice, 207; Gomez del Prado, Grégory,
‘Outlaw motorcycle gangs’ attempted intimidation of Quebec’s police forces’ (2011) 12 Deviant Behavior, 66;
Librett, M, ‘Wild pigs and outlaws: The kindred worlds of policing and outlaw bikers’ (2008) 4 Crime, Media,
Culture, 257.
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As harmonization of legislation, policies and practices in this field become an
international focus, I examine the role currently played by the European Union in promoting
these non-criminal justice 'alternative' enforcement strategies for the purpose of furthering the
development of international and domestic efforts to counter organized crime.
This study concludes that the European Union is, in fact, promoting this approach
through International Soft Law. The thesis then examines whether there are the same concerns
pertaining to matters such as due process and democratic principles as previously raised with
international efforts to suppress organized crime within the field of Transnational Criminal Law.

————
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Introduction
Transnational crime has been described as one of the major issues for policy making,
crime control and policing for the 21st century.3 The rise in ‘transnational crime’4 has been
considered to be the consequence of globalization, or at least facilitated by an increased
frequency and ease of: travel, trade, movement of capital and communications. Subsequently,
the problem that transnational crime presents has been said to be one that can no longer be dealt
with by domestic authorities in each country individually, because how law enforcement and
judicial authority are still fundamentally linked to sovereignty and limited by nation state
borders.5 With transnational crime being less and less limited by borders of nation states, an
international effort is needed to counter the problem — i.e. to prevent those involved in these
kind of crime from being able to operate out of safe havens and further their operations by
selective use of favourable jurisdictions. In the foreword of the Palermo Convention6 Kofi
Annan Secretary-General of the UN clearly states his view of ‘transnational organized crime’7 as
a global threat that has to be met with a global response.8

3

Louise I. Shelley, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center’s website, front page.
<www.policy-traccc.gmu.edu/ > Accessed 8 January 2011.
4
‘Transnational crime’ is a Criminological term that has been defined by Mueller, as: “. . . certain criminal
phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on
another country.” Mueller, Gerhard O W, ‘Transnational crime: Definitions and Concepts’ in P Williams and D
Vlassis (eds), Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (Frank Cass 2001), 13. As cited
in Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 954.
The term has been claimed to be an umbrella term for variety of criminal behaviour, including organized crime.
See: Fijnaut, ‘Transnational Crime and the role of the United Nations’, 8 European Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice (2000) 119, at 120. As cited in Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European
Journal of International Law, 953, at p 954.
5
Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, August 2009), p
262, 293 and 298 - 299. Smith, Jennifer M, ‘An International Hit Job’ (2009) 97 The Georgetown Law Journal,
1111, at p 1112 - 1116. Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag
2010) p 22. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15,
2000), p 2. United Nations News Centre, ‘Countries ignorant about threats posed by transnational crime – UN
agency chief’ (UN News Centre, April 23, 2007)
6
The Palermo Convention is what the ‘United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime’ is
frequently called both by practitioners and academics, as the convention was signed in Palermo Italy. United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000).
7
‘Transnational organized crime’ is a term that has been used about organized crime that are transnational or have
been considered to have transnational aspect. There seems however not to be any agreed up on definition. The kind
and degree of the transnational aspect needed for organized crime to be considered ‘transnational organized crime’

1

The call for global response has been answered, with a number of initiatives for
countering organized crime at both the transnational and the international level, including the
creation of international legal instruments to suppress the criminal activity. The most significant
of these international legal instruments are the UN ‘Palermo Convention’ in 2000, and two
international legal instruments introduced by the European Union: ‘Joint action of 21 December
1998’ and ‘The Organized Crime Framework Decision’ from 2008.9
The international efforts for countering transnational and organized crime by use of
‘International Law’ have been the focus of a healthy academic discussion. ‘Transnational
Criminal Law’ has been claimed to be a complementary legal term for the criminological term
‘transnational crime’10 and a “doctrinal match” in the field of law.11 Claiming Transnational
Criminal Law to be the venue for discussing ‘transnational crime’ within the field of law.
Consequently, the field of ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ has become an important venue of
academic discussion about international efforts for countering transnational and organized
crime.12

is unclear. ‘Transnational organized crime’ is by definition to be considered to fall under the criminological term
‘transnational crime’, See definition of ‘transnational crime’ in fn 4.
8
Annan, Kofi A, Foreword of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime p iii – iv.
<http://www.unodc.org/> Accessed 8 January 2011.
9
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000); The
Organized Crime Framework Decision [2008] OJ L300/42; Joint Action of 5 December 1997 adopted by the
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the
application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime
[1997] OJ L344/7.
10
This work will use Boister’s simplified definition for the term ‘transnational crime’: “. . .. transnational crime
describes conduct that has actual or potential trans-boundary effects of national and international concern.“ Boister,
N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at 954. Boister cites:
Mueller, Gerhard O W, ‘Transnational crime: Definitions and Concepts’ in P Williams and D Vlassis (eds),
Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (Frank Cass 2001), 13; Fijnaut, C,
‘Transnational crime and the role of the United Nations in its Containment through international cooperation: A
challenge for the 21st century’ [2000] Eur J Crime Crim L & Crim Just, 119.
11
Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 953 – 954.
12
See for example: Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime August 2009); Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag
2010).

2

Preliminary study suggests there to be an important difference between national and
international efforts for countering organized crime, a difference that seems to have gone largely
unnoticed by the academic discussion about international efforts for countering organized crime.
Academic discussion within the field of Transnational Criminal Law focuses on formal
‘criminal justice responses’13 to organized crime. For example, Neil Boister, who relabelled part
of the ‘International Criminal Law’14 as ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ in 2003, defined the term
as “. . . the indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law of criminal
activities that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects.”15 This definition raises concerns
for being too narrow and exclusive, by excluding the influence of international ‘soft law’16 and
responses based in other fields of law such as administrative and civil law, which I will examine.
It is evident that domestic authorities utilize not only criminal law and criminal justice responses
in their efforts to counter organized crime, but also a variety of non-criminal justice responses,
perhaps in particular when dealing with ‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’.
This apparent difference between domestic and international efforts raises important
questions as to whether there is a disconnect between practitioners tasked with countering
organized crime, national and supranational policymakers in the field, and the academic
discussion about organized crime. This raises three questions: Is there an increase in the
utilization of non-criminal justice responses at the domestic level? If so, have these enforcement
strategies failed to reach the attention of policymakers at the international level. We might
question why academic discussion has not examined this apparent difference in approach
between the domestic and the international efforts. Finally, I question whether lack of
13

See fn 1 for definition of criminal justice responses vs. non-criminal justice responses.
‘International Criminal Law’ “. . . is the primary international legal regime that addresses the atrocities of war and
other forms of inter-social conflict in the hope of providing accountability, which in turn is expected to lead to the
prevention of conflict and to the enhancement of peace prospects.” Bassiouni, M Cherif, Introduction to
International Criminal Law, 2nd Revised Edition (Brill 2012), at p cxxi. See also: Bassiouni, M Cherif, ‘The
sources and content of international criminal law: a theoretical framework’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International
Criminal Law, Volume I: Sources, Subjects, and Contents (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers / Brill Academic 2008), 3;
Currie, Robert J, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), at p 17 – 19.
15
Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 955.
Importantly however he limits the “indirect suppression by international law” with ‘Suppression Conventions’ –
suggesting a formal convention has to be in place between the states involved.
16
See on hard and soft International Law: Dixon, Martin, Textbook on International Law (5 edn, Oxford University
Press 2013).
See on International Soft Law: Guzman, Andrew T, and Timothy L Meyer, ‘“International Soft Law” by Andrew T.
Guzman, et al.’ (2010) 2 Journal of Legal Analysis, 171; Ho, Daniel E, ‘Compliance and International Soft Law:
Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law, 647.
14

3

knowledge, about domestic use of non-criminal justice responses, might have hindered the
development of efforts to incorporate these responses into an international more formalized set
of recommended responses to organized crime — and if such recommendations may raise fewer
concerns than the system of Transnational Criminal Law and the less formal transnationalization
of non-criminal justice responses, suspected to exist. The answer is not straightforward. While
the system of Transnational Criminal Law has been seen to focus on harmonization of domestic
criminal norms and academic knowledge about non-criminal justice responses seems to be
limited, and largely absent from discussion about international efforts for countering organized
crime – pluralist legal thinking suggests there to be important practical and theoretical
difficulties with transnationalization of domestic approaches and norms. Importantly, legal
pluralism shows there to be important practical and theoretical difficulties with the creation of
universal norms.17 Furthermore, pluralism emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary
understanding of law in its appropriate context within and outside the legal discipline.18
The study starts by reviewing academic literature on organized crime responses within
the field of Transnational Criminal Law, continues by reviewing literature on pluralism in global
governance as an alternative to the emphasize on harmonization within the field of Transnational
Criminal Law, and ends with reviewing academic literature on non-criminal justice responses to
organized crime. Following the literature component, this study examines how non-criminal
justice responses are being utilized by domestic authorities to counter organized crime. For
practical purposes, the examination will be limited to responses utilized for countering outlaw
motorcycle gangs in three countries: Canada, Germany and Iceland, as this study is limited in
space and time. Second, the study examines if non-criminal justice responses are being
promoted under International Law. Finally, I examine if concerns should be raised with
compatibility of the transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses with fundamental
principles of law, Human Rights and good governance. The examination will rely on the
concerns Boister raised with the system of Transnational Criminal Law, while adding one
17

Walker, Neil, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies, at p 533 - 541; Krisch,
Nico, ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’ [2009] Law Society and Economy Working Papers, at p 7 - 9
and 40 - 45.
18
Zumbansen, Peer, ‘Comparative, global and transnational constitutionalism: The emergence of a transnational
legal-pluralist order’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism, 16, at p 51.

4

concern found to be of importance from the discussion about the international efforts of the
European Union in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
Some concluding remarks will be offered, attempting to bring the findings into context
and showing their importance for the discussion about transnationalization of crime control and
criminal norms.
_________________________

5

Methods
This thesis starts with a threefold literature review. The first part provides an overview of
the literature on international efforts for countering organized crime in the field of Transnational
Criminal Law, then continues by providing an account of how pluralist legal thinking as an
alternative to the focus by the international community via Transnational Criminal Law on
harmonization of norms, affects legal studies. Finally an overview is provided of the literature
on non-criminal justice responses utilized domestically for the countering of organized crime.
The understanding acquired will serve as a basis for studying the presumed difference between
domestic and international efforts for the countering of organized crime. Furthermore, the
overview of existing literature is expected to provide knowledge of the concerns raised with both
approaches, capable of providing the basis for assessing if the promotion of non-criminal justice
responses under International Law would be likely to raise lesser concerns than the current
promotion of criminal justice responses raises.
The first phase of the research, the research into the utilization of non-criminal justice
responses for countering organized crime by domestic authorities in Canada, Germany and
Iceland, was limited to the kind of organized crime generally referred to as outlaw motorcycle
gangs.19
The selection of outlaw motorcycle gangs for studying the utilization of non-criminal
justice responses for the countering of organized crime was initially dictated by the author’s
existing knowledge of non-criminal justice responses being utilized to counter outlaw
motorcycle gangs perceived by authorities to be part of the local organized crime problem.
Furthermore, information about outlaw motorcycle gangs is more readily available than with
most other kinds of organized crime. Members do not hesitate to identify themselves with the
gangs and express themselves as gang members, as well as adhering to a culture with highly
visible insignia and running club houses under the gangs insignia.
In order to research the enforcement of outlaw motorcycle gangs, data collection was
based in part on the snowball method. The author contacted personal contacts acquired as a
19

See definition of outlaw motorcycle gangs in fn 2.
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police officer, all of which were at the time working as practitioners in law enforcement. These
contacts then introduced the author to other law enforcement practitioners that would be able to
inform the author further about the subject of the research. The process would then repeat itself.
All the law enforcement practitioners were tasked with countering organized crime in
some form, they were therefore able to inform of measures and approaches used by law
enforcement authorities to counter organized crime in one or more of the countries covered by
this research.
The contacts were asked to inform the author of any responses they knew to be utilized
for countering organized crime (specifically outlaw motorcycle gangs), regardless of their legal
basis or whether the responses were utilized in their own jurisdiction or not. The contacts were
informed that the author was particularly interested in non-criminal justice responses. The
contacts were asked to provide citable sources, but these practitioners frequently did not have
their information from publicly available sources and access might be restricted to their own
sources.
The contacts were assured that they would not be cited on the information they gave.
Furthermore, the contacts were assured that the measures they brought to the authors attention
would not be discussed in this work, unless on the basis of some citable information that would
provide the evidence for the use of these measures. Also, all the contacts were guaranteed
anonymity.
This method provided a valuable knowledge about variety of non-criminal justice
responses that were being utilized to counter outlaw motorcycle gangs. Media search, without
the guidance provided by the contacts, would presumably have generated some information but
the evidence on the use of other less publicly visible responses would have remained hidden.
Logically, it is easier to find evidence for something the existence of which is known,
than to look for everything that might be expected to exist, knowledge of a specific approach or
kind of measures makes it easier to recognize evidence of it when one comes across such
evidence. Consequently, knowledge of use of specific responses in one country would make a
search for such responses in another country easier, e.g. because of better knowledge of how
such responses looks like when implemented. Iceland was a natural country to focus on first due
to the author’s existing knowledge of organized crime responses there. Germany brings the
focus on one of the leading member states of the European Union, the Union arguably being the
7

main actor in transnationalization of criminal norms, also, Germany is known to have tried to
ban criminal organizations. Finally, the study is conducted in Canada, where responses for
countering organized crime seem to be under influence from both developments in Europe and
the United States of America.
Based on the information from the contacts five different searches were made for
publicly available information for the use of the non-criminal justice responses now known to be
used to counter organized crime by domestic authorities.
First, a focused media search was conducted for publicly available information showing
the use of responses in line with those described by the contacts as being utilized by domestic
authorities. This search was not limited to the countries being studied, but was limited by the
language knowledge of the author. This search was intended to inform of variety of responses
being utilized to counter organized crime.
Second, a more focused search was conducted, now limited to the three countries being
studied, Canada, Germany and Iceland. This search was guided by the knowledge of existing
non-criminal justice responses to organized crime, acquired from the contacts and the previous
media search. The author then assessed if each response should be considered to be a noncriminal justice response. For the purpose of this assessment, ‘non-criminal justice responses’
were considered neither to be intended to bring about criminal punishment, nor to carry out any
criminal punishment. However, failing to comply with these responses or conditions laid out by
them, might bring about criminal liability, without such criminal sanctions being the purpose of
these responses as such. Therefor, non-criminal justice response might have one or more
institution of the criminal justice system as part of the process, (such as police, prosecution, etc.)
or be entirely initiated, executed and controlled by such institutions. However, the responses as
such are neither based on the criminal law nor legislations intended to bring about or execute
criminal sanctions.20
Finally, a search was made for case law dealing with the non-criminal justice responses
found to be utilized in the three countries included in this study.

20

See my definition of non-criminal justice responses vs. criminal justice responses in fn 1.
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A second research was then conducted, on the basis of the acquired knowledge of noncriminal justice responses being utilized by domestic authorities for countering organized crime
– this time for evidence of non-criminal justice responses being promoted at the international
level. The purpose is to see if the utilization of non-criminal justice responses by domestic
authorities is influencing the approach taken by international efforts for countering organized
crime.
The research was conducted by utilizing the document search engines of the European
Union and the United Nations, these two being the main international bodies involved in the
suppression of organized crime at the international level according to the Transnational Criminal
Law literature review. The search engines were utilized to search for evidence of any promotion
of non-criminal justice response for the purpose of countering organized crime, such as outlaw
motorcycle gangs. The knowledge of non-criminal justices being utilized by domestic
authorities for countering organized crime, gained in the first part of the research, was used to
guide the search for any international promotion.
Finally, the study developed a test to examine if the promotion of non-criminal justice
responses would be likely to meet less criticism for incompatibility with fundamental principles
of law and good governance than the system of Transnational Criminal Law currently does. The
test is intended to indicate if the domestic approach of utilizing non-criminal justice responses
for countering organized crime should be influencing international efforts for the same purpose.
The test is developed from the main concerns raised for incompatibility of the system of
Transnational Criminal Law with fundamental principles of law and good governance, in
addition to the concern raised with lack of sound knowledge as a basis for policymaking.

Known limitations of this Method
Known weaknesses of the method have primarily to do with the initial research for noncriminal justice responses being utilized by domestic authorities. These concerns include that the
contacts are unlikely to have revealed all measures they knew to be used by authorities to counter
organized crime. Adding to the potential incompleteness of the research, due to confidentiality
requirements, no measures are being discussed in this work, for which the author did not find
9

publicly available information. Consequently, the sample of non-criminal justice responses
presented here should not be seen as a complete sample of such responses used by authorities in
the countries covered in this research.
Ideally this kind of research would benefit from being conducted in cooperation with
multinational or international institutions that are involved in crime control, capable of
facilitating the information sharing. Attempt was made to secure cooperation with both the
European Police Institute and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Unfortunately,
neither institution was able to provide full accessed to their data. Although, both institutions
deserve thanks for the information shared and support shown.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime shared its publication called "Digest of
Organized Crime Cases" that is a compilation of cases dealing with organized crime.21
However, examination showed the publication to be limited to criminal justice responses,
excluding non-criminal justice responses, such as for example civil and administrative measures.
Of the three languages of the three countries studied in this work the author only has
sufficient knowledge for academic work in two. Therefore assistance had to be received in
working with material in German, in which the author has only limited competence. Also,
information received had frequent references to measures used in other countries than those
being studied, often in variety of languages. The author’s ability to read all the Scandinavian
languages except Finish was therefore an asset, but inability to read languages such as French,
Italian and Dutch proved to be a weakness. Therefore, this methodology might be more
comprehensible for a group of researchers that together have proficiency in wider variety of
languages.

21

‘Digest of organized crime cases’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 16 October 2012).
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/ebook_E.pdf> Accessed 17 October 2012. See also about the
project at: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) official website:
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/digest-of-organized-crime-cases.html> accessed 17 October
2012.
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Literature review
Transnational crime have been described by academics as a major global issue. In the
words of Louise I. Shelley, a well known scholar in this field:
“Transnational crime will be a defining issue of the 21st century for
policymakers - as defining as the Cold War was for the 20th century and
colonialism was for the 19th. Terrorists and transnational crime groups will
proliferate because these crime groups are major beneficiaries of
globalization. They take advantage of increased travel, trade, rapid money
movements, telecommunications and computer links, and are well positioned
for growth.”22
Organized crime is considered to be a part of this Transnational Crime issue.
Increasingly transnational organized crime is considered to be a problem that can no longer be
dealt with by domestic authorities in each country individually, but that an international effort is
needed to counter the problem—i.e. via ‘harmonization’ of the way that individual countries deal
with the enforcement issues as well as with increased cooperation and joint efforts.23 In the
foreword of the Palermo Convention, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, clearly states
that transnational organized crime24 is a global threat that has to be met with a global response.25
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The European Union responded at a regional level in 1998 with the Joint Action, making
it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organization within its member states. Again in
2008, it adopted the Framework Decision on the fight against organized crime.26 The United
Nations responded on the international level with the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, better known as the Palermo Convention in 2000.27
The Palermo Convention has established organized crime as a crime under International
Criminal Law.
Public discussion tends to identify International Criminal Law with crime such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression, i.e. the crime that now
fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Neil Boister has however
emphasized that the so-called treaty crime are much greater in number than the crimes under
International Criminal Law sticto sensu. 28 Treaty crime being crime that have been established
by international treaties where states agree to criminalize specific conduct.29

Transnational Criminal Law – a field within International Criminal
Law
Boister and others claim it to be necessary to distinguish between International Law that
deals with International Crime stricto sensu and the part of International Criminal Law that deals
with crime that have become familiar to public discussion as Transnational Crime.30
Boister notes that Transnational Crime is a criminological rather than juridical term,
created “in order to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders,
transgressing the law of several states or having an impact on another country”31. However, he
26

The Organized Crime Framework Decision [2008] OJ L300/42; Joint Action of 5 December 1997 adopted by the
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the
application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime
[1997] OJ L344/7
27
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000)
28
Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at 956.
29
Currie, Robert John, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), at p 15 - 16.
30
Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953. Currie, Robert
John, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), at p 12 - 21.
31
Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 955.
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sees it as problematic that this term is unknown to international lawyers, who would use terms
such as ‘crime of international concern’ and ‘common crimes against internationally protected
interests’.32 Boister therefore suggests a legal term for the system of international law that
suppresses ‘transnational crimes’.
Boister claims to build on Philip Jessup’s use of the phrase “transnational law” as
describing “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers”.33 Boister
states that he wants a more restricted use of the term Transnational Criminal Law than had
previously been used. He claims the term traditionally to have been used to describe all criminal
law that were not entirely confined to its nation state, in line with Jessup’s definition of
“transnational law”.34 Boister defined Transnational Criminal Law as “the indirect suppression
by international law through domestic penal law of criminal activities that have actual or
potential trans-boundary effects.“35 Focusing on the network of treaties between states that
suppress “socially, economically and morally undesirable inter- and intra-state conduct” through
domestic penal law.36
Boister does not discuss why he restricts his definition of Transnational Criminal Law to
treaties suppressing activity through domestic penal law. By so doing he seems to omit other
kinds of domestic legislations than penal law that may be used to suppress “socially,
economically and morally undesirable inter- and intra-state conduct”37. It seems contradictory
for Boister to create a term to facilitate interdisciplinary discussion with other disciplines, but at
the same time to limit the discussion to a specific field within the legal discipline itself. The
limitation of the term to domestic penal law seems, partially at least, to defeat the purpose of
facilitating interdisciplinary discussions.
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Both Boister and Robert J. Currie refer to the treaties that form Transnational Criminal
Law as ‘suppression conventions’.38 Consequently, both of them seem to limit Transnational
Criminal Law to suppression through formal treaties under international law, as opposed to soft
law.39 By so doing they exclude varieties of soft law such as non-binding agreements,
recommendations, or agreed up on road maps that might be highly influential on the state parties.
Boister explains that the offences established by these suppression conventions, together with
what he calls International Criminal Law stricto sensu, were considered to fall within the broad
system of International Criminal Law. The difference being that offences established by the
suppression conventions only brought with them domestic criminal liability for individuals, and
in fact only after the relevant member state ratified the convention by enacting such liability into
domestic law. While International Criminal Law stricto sensu “. . . provide for individual penal
responsibility for violations of international law before an international penal tribunal.”40
Currie explains that by establishing suppression conventions the states agree to two
objectives. First, the objective to cooperate with each other to prevent offenders from finding
safe havens from prosecution in the other contracting states, and second to reinforce law
enforcement powers of the contracting states to suppress the activity made criminal under the
convention by way of joint effort.41 Currie furthermore states these conventions place three main
types of obligations on the contracting states to achieve these objectives.42 First, state parties
must criminalize the kind of conducts that falls under the convention. Second, they must take
jurisdiction over offences and offenders under the convention both territorially and
extraterritorially, including amending domestic law accordingly. And last, state parties must
accept the legal principle of aut dedere aut judicare, meaning that they have to either prosecute
offenders under the convention or extradite them to state parties willing to do so. The Palermo
convention is a case in point. The convention obligates state parties to criminalize specific
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conduct under articles 5, 6, 8 and 23, take jurisdiction under article 15 and at last the principle of
aut dedere aut judicare is to be found under article 16.
Boister discusses the following three main reasons for the need to bring increased focus
on this system of International Law that he calls Transnational Criminal Law.
His first reason is that Transnational Crime is a rapidly growing phenomenon43 and that
as a response to this growth the number of suppression conventions have grown rapidly to over
200 such treaties44, making Transnational Criminal Law “probably the most significant existing
mechanism for the globalization of substantive criminal norms.”45 However, he argues there to
be “far greater scope for legal ambiguity and abuse of rights in Transnational Criminal Law than
in International Criminal Law stricto sensu.”46 This reason has only grown to become more
relevant and pressing today than when Boister wrote his article more than ten years ago. There
has been substantive development in the supranationalization of criminal law within the
European Union after Boister made this claim. For example after the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 the
European Union has now the ability to introduce European criminal law and although greatly
limited, one of the subject matter where it has legislative competence is organized crime.47
Additionally the Lisbon Treaty provides that the union can now establish a European Public
Prosecutor's Office who’s power’s can be extended ” . . . to include serious crime having a crossborder dimension . . .”48
Secondly, Boister claims studies of Transnational Criminal Law have been neglected,
contributing to the lack of doctrinal basis for this field of law, “. . . where sovereignty is still a
dominant value but somewhat contradictorily, interstate cooperation is often extensive although
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beyond the reach of the public eye.”49 This is supported by Francesco Calderoni’s and Andreas
Schloenhardt’s claims that scientific studies are lacking in the field of organized crime.50 They
also claim legislation in the field to have been driven by particular incidents and politics rather
than scientific knowledge.51
Thirdly, Boister claims relabeling is necessary, as scholars had originally mislabelled
crime under the suppression conventions as crime against internationally protected interests. The
relabeling would draw a clear distinction between crime that are international crime, considered
to be “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”52, and
those that might be seen to be of less universal values and interests. This re-labeling being
necessary to “. . . draw attention to the deficiencies of this increasingly important system.”53
Boister is concerned that the system of Transnational Criminal Law creates risk of
ambiguity and risk of abuse of rights, his apprehension is based on the following six main
concerns:
•

Transnational Criminalization

•

Legitimacy in the Development of the System

•

Doctrinal Weaknesses in the System

•

Human Rights Considerations

•

Legitimacy in the Control of the System

•

Enforcement of the System
With regards to transnational criminalization, Boister finds it dangerous to form

transnational morality without holistic policy and coherency with fundamental principles.54 He
finds it necessary to ask questions about what constitutes the threat intended to counter and if the
appropriate response at the international level is to promote penal response. He also finds the
49
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creation of the system at the transnational level, by democracy of states, to suffer from
democratic deficiency where the citizens have little to do with its adoption or application.55 He
is concerned of doctrinal weaknesses in the system by lack of coherency of general principles,
procedures, penalties and the scope of criminal liability.56 Additionally, he points out that the
system does not ensure compatibility with Human Rights.57 Furthermore, Boister is concerned
of legitimacy in the control of the system, especially undue influence of powerful states, that he
claims to have promoted the system due to their own sensitivity and vulnerability to many of the
activities the system is intended to suppress.58 Finally, Boister is concerned about the weak and
infrequently used provisions for enforcement of Transnational Criminal Law, which he claims is
an informal gradient system of inducement, the development of which was driven by few
powerful states for their own purposes.59
Calderoni seems to share Boister’s concern for the influence of the international legal
instruments on domestic law, but rather because of lack of quality and best knowledge basis of
the instruments than concerns about legitimacy.60 Calderoni claims that the legal instruments
introduced for the joint efforts of countering organized crime do not reflect best scientific
knowledge in the field. Consequently, Calderoni is concerned that member states of the Union
will be forced to amend legislations, of higher quality and stronger base in scientific knowledge,
to approximate to the legal instruments of the European Union.
To summarize, common policy for countering Transnational Crime is being created at the
international level, influencing and perhaps up to a point steering domestic response of the
member states.61 At the same time there has been an ongoing discussion about legitimacy
problems in global governance, revolving inter alia around the democratic deficiency of the
European Union, where this supranational body, created by a multinational treaty, is creating
55

Ibid, at p 957 - 958.
Ibid, at p 958.
57
Ibid, at p 959.
58
Ibid, at p 959 - 960.
59
Ibid, at p 960.
60
Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 25.
61
Baker, Estella, and Christopher Harding, ‘From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal study of the Third
Pillar’ (2009) 34 European Law Review. Baker, E, ‘Governing through crime -- the case of the European Union’
(2010) 7 European Journal of Criminology, 187, at p 188 - 191.
56

17

norms that either have direct effect at the domestic level or obliges member states to change their
domestic law so as to conform to European Union Law.62
Boister and some likeminded scholars claim the system of Transnational Criminal Law to
be a powerful system of International Law but that the system is haunted by a variety of
problems. The scholars claim that these problems are caused by three main issues; academic
knowledge is lacking in the field, consequently the system and the responses promoted by it are
not based on best academic knowledge in the field, lack of academic knowledge in the field
being an issue in its own right, and last but not least complexity of the social problems intended
to counter - portrayed e.g. by the absent of consensus on how to define these problems organized crime being a case in point.

International efforts to suppress organized crime through domestic
penal law – the system of Transnational Criminal Law.
As noted by Boister, the system of Transnational Criminal Law is made up of
suppression conventions that developed in response to the most pressing issues of the time.
Taking as an example how a number of hijacking conventions were adopted in the late 1960’s
and early 1970’s as a response to hijacking becoming a global problem.63 By the end of the last
century, Transnational Organized Crime was claimed to be on the rise and Kofi Annan, then the
Secretary-General of the UN, stated in the year 2000 that transnational organized crime had
become a global threat that had to be met with a global response.64 The call for international
response against organized crime continues. As a response to this, policy is being formed on a
supranational basis, including but not limited to conventions, affecting domestic policy and
legislations.65
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‘Harmonization’ towards criminal justice response
The European Union responded to the call for a transnational integrated response to
organized crime at a regional level in 1998 with its Joint Action, making it a criminal offence to
participate in a criminal organization in its member states, requiring its member states to amend
their domestic law accordingly.66 The Joint Action also introduced a definition for a criminal
organization.67 The definition has meet criticism from the scholarly community, e.g. for being
vague and lacking the minimum clarity required in criminal law.68
The UN responded on the international level in 2000 with the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, better known as the Palermo Convention.69 The main
goal for the Palermo Convention was to facilitate transnational cooperation in the subject field of
organized crime. Nevertheless, the convention also introduced its own definition of an organized
criminal group that has become a global standard.70 That definition was, however, a political
settlement between contradicting views of the signatory states of what constitutes organized
crime, for the scope of the convention.71 Because the scope of the convention was to facilitate
transnational cooperation, the definition was not intended to tell the signatory states what they
UNODC Chief ahead of Vienna Conference on transnational organized crime’, (UNODC press release 11 October
2012) <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/allpress.html?ref=fp> accessed 7 March 2013
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‘Draft Council Conclusions on the creation and implementation of a EU policy cycle for organised and serious
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should regard to be organized crime and therefore was not drafted for such purpose.72 The
convention, again like the European Union’s Joint Action, provides for two model offences that
either or both must be established as criminal offences.73 One has been called the conspiracy
model, criminalizing conspiracy between two or more persons to commit a crime involving an
organized criminal group, the other has been called the participation model, criminalizing
participation in such group. The model offences have meet criticism from the academic
community primarily for being overly broad and under inclusive.74 Neither of the model
offences make any kind of transnational element a requirement in the description of the offence.
Even if, article 3 of the Palermo Convention, titled Scope of the application clearly states that the
scope of the Convention is where an offence is “transnational in nature”.75 Consequently, the
influence of the Convention can be seen to exceed its scope by introducing model offences at the
domestic level that are not limited to offences that are “transnational in nature”. In fact, the
organized crime offence in the Icelandic criminal code, art 175 a, was enacted to fulfill Iceland’s
obligations under the Palermo Convention.76 The offence does not mention transnational
elements as a requirement and the travaux préparatoires does not mention any legislative intent
to limit the offence to activities that have transnational element.77
The European Union acted again in 2008 by adopting the Framework Decision. The
2008 Framework Decision had minor differences from the Palermo convention and it’s
72
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predecessor, the Joint Action from 1998.78 The participatory model offence is changed so as not
to include any more the reference to “other activities” than criminal, now only applying to
criminal activities and listed non-criminal behaviours.79 The non-criminal activities being listed
as “provision of information or material means, the recruitment of new members and all forms of
financing of its activities.80
The decision also requires the member states to introduce a minimum sanction of two to
five years for the offence of participation in a criminal organization.81 Finally the decision
requires, that committing an offence within the framework of a criminal organization may count
as an aggravating circumstance in the member states, a requirement not either to be found in the
other two international legal instruments.
These three international legal instruments all attempt to suppress organized crime by
requiring their member states to criminalize specific activities under their domestic law.82
Therefore they all meet the standards set by Boister for being part of Transnational Criminal Law
– “. . . the indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law of criminal
activities that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects.”83 Whether the European Union
legal instruments qualify as suppression conventions can however be contested.
However, the transnational efforts for harmonization of domestic legislations are not
limited to ‘criminal law responses’84 but are concerned more generally with ‘criminal justice
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responses’85. This work will differentiate between these two terms, ‘criminal law responses’ is
considered to be responses that are based directly on the criminal law, while the ‘criminal justice
responses’ additionally include responses for bringing about or enforce the criminal law although
having a different legal basis. The international legal instruments require participating states – in
addition to them introducing ‘criminal law responses’ – to introduce domestic legislations for
furthering transnational cooperation in criminal matters; for facilitating detection, investigation
and adjudication across borders, as well as to facilitate execution of sanctions.86
An important difference between the three above discussed legal instruments is that the
Palermo convention promotes ‘criminal justice responses’ in general, while the two European
Union instruments only promote ‘criminal law responses.87 In fact, the cooperative provisions of
the Palermo convention were said to have been the main concern for the negotiation of the
convention, the model offences and definition of organize crime having been a secondary
concern.88 However, this difference should not be overstated, as the European Union goes even
further in promoting ‘criminal justice responses’ other than ‘criminal law responses’, only the
Union does so in a variety of different international legal instruments.89
International efforts continue to promote criminal justice responses for countering
organized crime.90 Within the European Union, policy is being formed and introduced both on
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its transnational and supranational level, facilitating cooperation of member states in this field
and influencing domestic policy and legislations.91 The United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime assists member states to the Palermo Convention in implementing their domestic law to
fulfill their international obligations under the convention.92 The same United Nation’s body has
published ’Digest of organized crime cases’ which is a compilation of best practice and case law
for countering organized crime in line with the convention.93 Together the Palermo convention
and the guidance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime must be seen to influence
domestic policy on how to counter organized crime globally, although probably not as influential
on its member states as the European Union instruments.
The above coverage shows how international efforts are influencing domestic responses
for countering organized crime, focusing on harmonization of criminal justice responses.

The Organized Crime discussion within the field of Transnational
Criminal Law
The main theme of the Transnational Criminal Law discussion regarding organized crime
evolves about what could be called the definition crises of the organized crime term, as no
agreed up on definition exists for the term. Leading to the absence of that fundamental definition
in all the three international legal instruments for countering organized crime listed above. All of
these three international legal instruments instead introduce criminal offences based on a
marginally different definition for ‘an organized criminal group’ or ‘a criminal organization’.94
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Political differences between nation states, as to how organized crime should be defined,
seem to have thwarted the creation of a global definition. Part of the political difference having
to do with how some countries feared that a too broad definition would make it possible to class
cases of terrorism as organized crime, while other countries preferred that exact possibility.95
However, as stated above, the absent of definition seems to some extent to be caused by the fact
that the contracting states did not intend to create a definition that would tell the signatory states
what they should regard to be organized crime – but only to frame the scope of their
transnational cooperation in the field.96
Academics have no more than the politicians been able to agree upon a definition for the
phenomenon.97 Some scholars have argued that the appropriate way to define organized crime
would be to base a definition on the distinctive features of organized crime.98 However, no
agreement has been reached as to what those distinctive features are.99 Other scholars have
claimed: “. . . we might define organized crime as being that crime that is committed by criminal
organizations.”100 Yet others seem to regard it favourable to consider the method of operation
(modus operandi) as the basis for describing the characteristics of organized crime.101 Where
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legal activity or aims can fall within the scope of organized crime legislations where the
intimidating power of a criminal association is used to bring about submission.
Calderoni has claimed that although there is no general agreement on a definition for
organized crime, several studies have indicated four common elements:
•

Continuity. The group must have a stable structure suited to the continuous and
indefinite commission of crimes, independently of its membership (Finckenauer 2005,
66; Bäckman 1998, 25; Hagan 2006, 135).

•

Violence. The group exploits its force to use or to threaten to use violence or
intimidation. This may be addressed to other criminal groups, minor criminals,
legal/illegal competitors and victims (Finckenauer 2005, 66; Bäckman 1998, 26; von
Lampe et al. 2006, 36; Spinellis 1997, 813).

•

Enterprise. The group’s main goals are profit and power. These are usually pursued
through the production and/or exchange of illegal goods and/or services in illegal
markets (Finckenauer 2005, 66–67; Hagan 2006, 134; Spinellis 1997, 813).

•

Immunity. The group can corrupt or exert influence on other subjects (politicians,
media, judicial authorities, administrators, enterprises) in order to shield its activities
from any form of sanctions (Finckenauer 2005, 67; Bäckman 1998, 27; Hagan 2006,
135; Spinellis 1997, 813).102
However, he claims that none of the definitions provided in the international legal

instruments for countering organized crime clearly reflect any of these elements. Orlova and
Moore claim that it would have been better that the state parties would have omitted the
definition under article 2 of the Palermo convention “rather than create a definition that is
arguably both overly broad and under-inclusive.”103
Existing definitions have been criticized for overbreadth and vagueness, effectively
allowing authorities to use organized crime legislations against other groups that are not
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favoured by the government, but for other reasons than organized criminality.104 As mentioned
above this was one of the issues thwarting the negotiations about definitions for the Palermo
convention.105
Additionally, it has been argued that heavier punishments and increased law enforcement
powers were justified by elevated harm and danger to the society caused by organized crime.106
This justification has, however, been argued to fail, on account of vagueness and overbreadth of
definitions, causing other groups of people than criminal organizations and other activities than
organized crime to be subject to organized crime legislations.107
On this same account definitions of organized crime have been said to violate the
proportionality principle. By way of providing for increased punishment for organized crime
activities, without providing definitions that secure that these increased punishments apply only
for organized crime activities.108 Consequently, failing to recognize how proportionality “. . .
must always be measured by weighing the freedom of each individual against his/her own
criminal activity”.109
Also, this overbreadth and vagueness of the definitions of organized crime, or lack of
such definition, has been criticized for violating fundamental principles of the criminal law.110
Estela Baker has pointed out how the definition problem poses a treat to the principle of clarity
in criminal law, noting that “[I]t is a basic requirement of the rule of law that criminal law should
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be sufficiently clear for individuals to be able to discriminate between those acts that will
infringe the norms that it lays down and those which will not”.111
Another important theme of the discussion about organized crime legislations has been
the extension of criminal liability these laws generally provide for. As Schloenhardt explains,
organized crime offences generally extend criminal liability beyond traditional boundaries of
criminal liability.112 “Liability arises on the basis of loose associations and intentions, rather
than on the basis of proven physical results or harmful conduct.”113 A person can become
responsible for actions taken before the preparation and even the planning of the offence in
question.114 Schloenhardt cites Frank Verbruggen that the classic theory has been:
“. . . that states should not intervene in human relations with a blunt
instrument like criminal law unless damage has been done to a specific
“legally proscribed interest”, “a common good” like property, sexual
integrity or life and limb. [...] Instead, criminal law becomes a tool to prevent
the damage from ever happening, by making endangerment the threshold for
intervention and sanctioning.”115
Towards the same end Schloenhardt cites Mullins that:
“[t]his 'remoteness of social danger' can undermine the justification for
criminal liability to apply.[...] In a properly minimalist system of criminal
law, conduct that is too remote from social harm should not be
criminalised”116
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Schloenhardt remarks that concerns have been raised over the compatibility of this
broadening of criminal liability with basic ideas of the role of the criminal law and traditional
principle of criminal law.117 He cites Edward Wise for concerns over compatibility with:
“. . . traditional principles of criminal law which are supposed to require
focusing attention on the concrete specific act of a specific individual at a
specific moment in time and on that individual’s own personal guilt, not on
that of his associates.”118
This concern over creating guilt by association has been yet another theme of the
discussion about organized crime legislations. David Freedman notes that many countries have
been introducing new forms of individual criminal liability under organized crime legislations.119
Where individual conduct is criminalized but the activity that constitutes the substantive offence
is a group activity. This Freedman sees as a difficult move:
“Our criminal law has always professed to be concerned with the acts or
omissions of a discrete individual, with doctrine crafted to link the requisite
fault requirements of a given offence with the moral and social
considerations that rationalize stigma and punishment - in respect of that
individual and for that offence alone. With targeted organized crime laws we
move [...] closer, some might say, to guilt by association.”120
Additionally, concerns have been expressed over the compatibility of criminalization of
association with the right to freedom of association as a fundamental Human Right.121
Concerns have also been raised over what should be a punishable level of involvement
with a group.122
117

Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime August 2009),
at p 287 and 36 - 37.
118
Wise, Edward M, ‘RICO and its Analogues: Some Comparative Considerations’ (2000) 27 Syracuse J. Int'l &
Com., 303, at p 321. As cited in: Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime August 2009), 38.
119
Freedman, David, ‘The New Law of Criminal Organizations in Canada’ (2006) 85 The Canadian Bar Review,
171 at p 172.
120
Freedman, David, ‘The New Law of Criminal Organizations in Canada’ (2006) 85 The Canadian Bar Review,
171 at p 172 - 173. Edward Wise raises similar concerns, see: Wise, Edward M, ‘RICO and its Analogues: Some
Compatative Considerations’ (2000) 27 Syracuse J. Int'l & Com., 303 at p 321.
121
Wise, Edward M, ‘RICO and its Analogues: Some Compatative Considerations’ (2000) 27 Syracuse J. Int'l &
Com., 303 at p 321. Kent Roach, ‘Panicking over Criminal Organizations: We Don’t Need Another Offence’ (2000)
44(1) Criminal Law Quarterly 1 at 2. As cited in Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime August 2009), p 38.

28

In fact, scholars have claimed that the criminal law is ill suited to deal with collective
behaviour such as organized crime.123 Estella Baker claims that:
“The criminal law copes badly when harm amounting to a criminal act takes
place as a result of the collective actions or omissions of a group of
individuals or of an organization, especially where the blame for their
occurrence is widely diffused among a body of actors.”124
Consequently, it is no small task to draft criminal law provisions capable of effectively counter
the perceived criminal activity, while still being compatible with fundamental principles of the
criminal law, principles that have developed in a system that traditionally was mainly concerned
with individual behaviour.
Finally, the discussion about organized crime in the field of Transnational Criminal Law
has to some extent evolved around the different models of organized crime offences in the world.
Schloenhardt has claimed different legislative approaches have created four different models of
organized crime offences and listed them as:
“1. The conspiracy model, found in the CTOC125 and in all Australian
jurisdictions, as well as Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Papua
New Guinea;
2. The participation model stipulated by the CTOC126, and also adopted in
Canada, New Zealand, New South Wales (Australia), China, Macau, Chinese
Taipei (Taiwan), and in Australian federal criminal law;
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3. The enterprise model based on the US RICO Act, which is also used in
many US states, and the Philippines; and
4. The labelling/registration model of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia,
Japan, New South Wales, Queensland, Northern Territory, and South
Australia.”127
Schloenhardt remarks that “. . . the organised crime laws are local responses to local
problems.”128 Claiming the criminal law provisions are tailored to suit a particular organized
crime problem perceived to demand a response at a given time in a particular society.
There are however those that claim that specific organized crime offences are not needed,
like Kent Roach. Roach has claimed, speaking in the Canadian domestic context, that new
offences are not needed and will in fact not ‘get the job done’.129 Some, like Dorean Koenig,
even consider these offences to have become a problem themselves by threatening to change the
criminal justice system “. . . by greatly increasing the reach of the criminal law and enhancing
sentences, while lessening the mens rea requirements.”130
Schloenhardt has taken similar stance as Orlova and Moor, in their article on international
response to organized crime and terrorism in 2005, that specific offences are more feasible than
general ‘catch-all’ offences.131 Orlova and Moor recommended a number of conventions with
clear definitions and clearly defined and limited offences, which would create a ‘building block’
of conventions for countering organized crime. Rather than creating vague and ill defined
‘umbrella offences’, like they considered the Palermo convention to have done. Similarly
Schloenhardt has recommended specific offences for criminalizing selected key functions of
criminal organizations, avoiding broad and uncertain terms, and requiring proof of specific
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mental element.132 He claims that this way the legislations can avoid the criticism of vagueness
and overbreadth. Furthermore, he argues this approach to impose penalty that is proportionate to
the intentions and knowledge of the specific individuals accused, based on their individual
blameworthiness.
The four models listed by Schloenhardt above, all fall in the category of what here is
called ‘catch-all’ or ‘umbrella offences’, including the two model offences of all the three main
international legal instruments intended to counter organized crime.
Latest developments suggest that the organized crime term is now being complemented,
or even giving way for the term, ‘serious crime’. Nicholas Dorn reflects up on this switch from
the organized crime term towards the serious crime term in his article ‘The end of organised
crime in the European Union’.133 Dorn claims that the presumption that a crime being organized
equals that it is serious, and visa versa, is giving way for more harm based assessment.134
Claiming that the shift towards the ‘serious crime’ term will allow policing prioritization and
cooperation to be guided by assessment of social harm as opposed to structural assessment such
as level of organization. However, the shift towards the ‘serious crime’ term seems not to have
brought about the emphasize on assessment of social harm that Dorn predicted in 2008.
Judging from the use of the term ‘serious crime’ within the European Union, the term
seems to be introduced as a concept that has wider scope than ‘organized crime’, organized crime
being only but one form of ‘serious crime’.135 One evidence of this is how the term is utilized to
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describe the objective of the European Police Office (EUROPOL) with the expressed intent to “.
. . ensure that Europol can assist the competent authorities of the Member States in combating
specific forms of serious crime, without the current limitation that there must be factual
indications that an organised criminal structure is involved.”136 Still, this study was unable to
find any definition for the term ‘serious crime’ in any of the many documents of the European
Union that use the term, in fact there is little discussion to be found about the term’s definition.137
Some of the documents present a list of criminal activities that are considered ‘serious crime’,
however the activities listed as constituting ‘serious crime’ differ between the lists.
It should, furthermore, be noted that the term ‘serious crime’ was part of the United
Nations definition of an ‘organized criminal group’ in the Palermo convention. There ‘serious
crime’ is defined as a crime, punishable by at least four years maximum penalty.138 This is
problematic, as the criminal activity considered to be ‘serious crime’ can consequently wary
between jurisdictions and domestic authorities can choose to include or exclude certain activities
from being considered ‘serious crime’ simply by changing the maximum penalty under domestic
law. Also, the United Nations definition of ‘serious crime’ does not rely on assessment of harm.
The above listing of the European Union of activities considered to be ‘serious crime’, suggests
that to the European Union ‘serious crime’ is what the Union sais it is.
The Organized Crime discussion within the field of Transnational Criminal Law shows
there to be practical and theoretical difficulties with the attempts made to counter organized
crime by way of criminalizing organized crime specifically. To large extent caused by the
absence of consensus of what is the social problem intended to counter and what actions
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constitute that said social problem. This definitional issue seems not easily solved, least of all by
casting the net even wider and less restrictively with the introduction of the new term ‘serious
crime’, term even less defined than ‘organized crime’.
	
  
	
  

Pluralism as an alternative to ‘harmonization’
Transnational and international efforts to influence and harmonize domestic efforts for
countering organized crime should be seen as a form of global governance. Transnational
Criminal Law according to Boister is: “the indirect suppression by international law through
domestic penal law of criminal activities that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects.”139
By definition it is the global governance of domestic legislation within its limited subject field,
indirectly governing activities of individuals. Therefore, Transnational Criminal Law needs to
be examined in the context of academic discussions about global governance. That discussion
has raised a variety of practical and theoretical issues facing global governance. Academic
discussion on constitutional pluralism show there to be real problems both theoretically and
practically with drafting a normative order at the global or even regional level.140
The above discussion shows international efforts for countering organized crime to focus
largely on the constitutionalization of the field of law governing transnational efforts for the
countering of organized crime, by creation of universal norms and harmonization of domestic
legislations towards those universal norms. Therefore, when considered in the context of
academic discussion on legal pluralism, these international efforts for countering organized
crime seem to raise both theoretical and practical issues. Additionally, Peer Zumbansen’s
writings claim that constitutional pluralism raises important doubt of current approach, of
harmonization towards model offences, ability to yield real harmonization.141 Subsequently,
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international efforts for the countering of organized crime need to be considered in the light of
pluralist legal thinking in the field of global governance and transnational comparative law.
After all, these international efforts are part of globalization of governance and transnational
comparative law is the tool both for assessing existing domestic effort for the selection of best
practices, and for the drafting of international policies and legal instruments that will truly bring
about the intended results.
Constitutionalism has become the predominant form of governance and legal ordering,
but has come under increasing criticism; see for example James Tully’s work titled Strange
Multiplicity.142 His criticism is primarily focused on the inability of constitutional schemes to “.
. . cope with serious social and cultural diversity because of its strong link to ideas of impartiality
and uniformity.”143 Tully’s criticism was primarily concerned with nation states, but his
arguments have been seen to be even stronger at the subnational level, where diversity can be
expected to be even greater than in any nation state.144
Pluralism has been suggested as an alternative to constitutionalism as a normative order
for global governance and lately global administrative law. Neil Walker explained that unlike
the constitutional ideas that saw the world order as “. . . one of completeness and hierarchy
within each constitutional unit and limited interaction between units, . . .”145 the pluralism sees “.
. . the incompleteness of the discrete units and an increased emphasis on the heterarchical
relations between the units.”146
Similarly Nico Krisch has described constitutional pluralism in the following way:
“While constitutionalists, drawing on domestic inspirations, generally strive
for a common frame to define both the substantive principles of the overall
order and the relations between its different parts, pluralists prefer to see the
postnational realm as characterised by heterarchy, by an interaction of
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different sub-orders that is not subject to common legal rules but takes a
more open, political form.”147
It is argued here that the international efforts in the filed of Transnational Criminal Law
strive to constitutionalize the field, by creation of common frame and hierarchical order of norms
both at the international and the domestic level.
Krisch has in his writings on global administrative law endorsed Tully’s claim of the
difficulties that face constitutionalist models, claiming constitutional pluralism as a better
equipped form of global governance to deal with diversity of loyalty and interests when
confronted with the fact of this pluralist legal universe.148 Claiming constitutional pluralism to
have: ”. . . significant strengths in providing adaptability, space for contestation, and a possibility
of steering between conflicting supremacy claims of different polity levels.“149
Michel Rosenfeld had previously claimed that pluralism is the right approach for our
“pluralist-in-fact universe”150, where he sees power to be spread among the national-,
transnational- and supranational level.151 He argues “that it is possible to reconcile legal and
ideological pluralism by abandoning hierarchy and countenancing inconsistencies falling short of
incompatibilities in a highly layered and segmented legal universe.”152 For this Rosenfeld has
suggested some existing constitutional tools, most of which contribute to the layering of
communities, administration, conflict resolution and “self”. He seems to favour conflict
resolution at the lowest possible level involving only those relevantly affected.153
Krisch notes that the pluralism approach will not be free from difficulties, but after
analyses and comparison of the normative appeals and difficulties of different forms of
constitutionalism on the one hand and different forms of constitutional pluralism on the other, he
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finds in favour of the pluralist approach.154 “In the divided, highly contested space of the
postnational, ideal solutions are elusive – and pluralism may be the best option we have.”155
The above discussion claims that we live in a “pluralist-in-fact universe”156 where every
person finds himself subject to varieties of often overlapping norms and subject to power of
different levels of governance, domestic, trans- and supranational. This description seems to
reflect well the findings of both Calderoni and Schloenhardt in the field of Transnational
Criminal Law showing the diversity of organized crime legislation and the influence that
international legal instrument have had on these legislations.157
Academic discussion on constitutional pluralism show there to be real problems both
theoretically and practically with drafting a normative order at the global or even regional
level.158 For example, even the relatively homogeneous region of the European Union failed, at
least for now, in its attempt to create a constitution for the Union.159 The discussion shows the
difficulty in drafting a system capable of creating norms for such socially and culturally diverse
polity, as is the ‘global community’. Whereas scholars like Rosenfeld suggest creating layering
in the attempt to solve conflict at the lowest possible level, where conflicting interests and norms
are likely to be fewer in number, involving only those relevantly affected.160
Surprisingly, in the light of the above detailed discussion, the international efforts in the
field of Transnational Criminal Law seems nevertheless to emphasize the creation of a common
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framework to harmonize domestic criminal law as crucial for international efforts intended to
suppress organized crime. Furthermore, the emphasize of the academic discussion seems to be
on the existing norms and constitutionalizing efforts, with the aim of creating universally
applicable definitions and norms, capable of countering the variety of different organized crime
problems in the world. While the pluralist arguments show the feasibility of heterarchical
relationship and cooperation mechanism, to further common goals and policies, based on best
knowledge and experience.
Furthermore, Peer Zumbansen’s writings on constitutional pluralism suggest that the
harmonization of norms in the field of Transnational Criminal Law is not on its own likely to
yield a real harmonization of responses and effects at the domestic level. Zumbansen has
emphasized functionalism, interdisciplinary approach and appropriate context as essential for
today’s comparative legal studies.161
Zumbansen has claimed that “[a]t the heart of comparing legal cultures today lies an
unavoidably interdisciplinary study of legal and non-legal norms, routines and social
practices”.162 Zumbansen suggests “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist
comparisons”163, which he claims cannot be fruitfully realized without drawing from insights of
other disciplines.164 Zumbansen argues that comparative legal studies in today’s pluralistic legal
reality have to be conducted in the appropriate legal-, historical-, economic-, political-, socialand ideological-context both locally and internationally.165
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Zumbansen’s writings do not build a good case for harmonization of norms, arguing that
the same legal text might have different effect or be implemented differently in countries that
differ in their legal-, historical-, economic-, political-, social- and ideological-context.
Suggesting that the harmonization of domestic organized crime legislations does not necessarily
yield harmonization of responses intended to counter organized crime, let alone bring any
assurance for having the same effects in different contest of different societies.
Additionally, Zumbansen’s writings suggest that international efforts intended to share
practices and experiences between nation states, must be based on studies of existing practices
and experiences in both nation states conducted with “interdisciplinary understanding of
functionalist comparisons”166, in the appropriate context of legal and non-legal norms, routines
and social practices.167 Suggesting that such extensive understanding of existing practices and
experiences in both nation states is fundamental for the apprehension of sound knowledge
capable of making such information sharing truly beneficial.
Zumbansen’s writings seem also relevant to any comparative legal studies of
Transnational Criminal Law in general and in particularly subjects as heavily influenced by
international efforts as organized crime. The findings of both Calderoni and Schloenhardt show
a wide variety of domestic legislations intended to counter organized crime.168 Schloenhardt has
noted that “. . . the organised crime laws are local responses to local problems.”169 Furthermore,
he gives a detailed account of relevant political, historical, social and legal context of these local
responses.170 Subsequently, academic research in the field seems to support Zumbansen’s
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argument for need for “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons”171 in
appropriate context of legal and non-legal norms, routines and social practices.172
Such interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparison in appropriate context,
seems to require a study of organized crime legislations in different jurisdictions to take into
consideration all responses utilized for this purpose, not only criminal justice responses. If for
nothing else, for the sake of how availability of additional responses can be expected to affect the
implementation of criminal justice responses, if only for the fact that the availability of different
measures for countering organized crime might affect the approaches chosen by the practitioners
tasked with individual cases.
The field of Transnational Criminal Law can learn three main things from the pluralist
discussion on global governance. First, real problems exist both theoretically and practically
with drafting universal norms to counter organized crime for such socially and culturally diverse
polity, as is the ‘global community’. Second, promoting or developing responses to organized
crime from the practices and experience of different nation states seem to require
“interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons”173 of the relevant legal and nonlegal norms, routines and social practices in their appropriate context. Finally, this contests the
narrow scope of Transnational Criminal Law as a platform for legal discourse about
transnational crime, such as organized crime, as Transnational Criminal Law is by definition
limited to how international law stricto sensu indirectly suppresses criminal activity through the
use of ‘penal law’ – in the face of evidence of International Soft Law indirectly suppressing
criminal activity through non-criminal justice responses.
Literature on domestic Non-Criminal Justice Responses to Organized Crime
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Non-criminal justice responses for the countering of criminal behaviour can be divided
into two categories: responses that focus on proceeds of crime, versus a wider range of
preventive and disruptive responses to criminal activities. The latter approach is the main
subject of this thesis. The former approach, to utilize non-criminal justice responses for going
after assets suspected to be instruments or proceeds of crime, in particular so called nonconviction based forfeitures and money laundering has been substantively discussed in academic
debate. Hence, it is not deemed necessary or useful to re-examine in detail the criminal asset
approach here, however, a short account must be given for the sake of context and to make use of
observations already made as part of that discussion. For a more detailed coverage of the
proceeds of crime approach Angela Leong offers a good coverage with emphasize on the United
Kingdom in here book ‘The Disruption of International Organized Crime’.174

Focus on the proceeds of crime
The category that emphasizes the proceeds of crime can be said to have two main
approaches, one that focuses on preventing assets from the illicit economy from entering the licit
one, and another that focuses on ways to deprive criminals of assets that are found to be proceeds
of crime or instruments of crime.
Countering Money Laundering
Wide variety of responses have been introduced for countering money laundering, the act
of moving assets from the illicit economy into the licit one. Part of the approach has been to
criminalize the conduct, but additionally, responses have been introduced for making financial
information accessible, ensure review of this information and to place duties on the private sector
to report suspicious transactions. Moreover, these actions have been promoted at the
international level.175
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Most importantly the Financial Action Task Force has contributed heavily to bringing
about national legislations and regulations to counter money laundering.176 In fact, the
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force can be said to have set the international
standards for domestic legislations and regulatory framework for countering money
laundering.177 The task force even examines if member states adhere to the recommendations,
and noncompliant member states can be ‘blacklisted’.178
These recommendations are a unique example of how ‘International Soft Law’, with no
legally binding force and no formal International Law enforcement mechanism, has been able to
shape international standards and national legislations.179 Studies have shown incredible
compliance to the recommendations and suggestions of the Financial Action Task Force,
showing how soft International Law can bring about just as much compliance or even more
compliance than International Law stricto sensu sometimes called ‘International Hard Law’.180
Additionally, the Financial Action Task Force recommendations show non-criminal
justice responses to be utilized to counter criminal activities, as only a portion of the
recommendations strive to bring about criminal sanction.181 Many of the recommendations can
be seen to have primarily preventive purposes, in fact a whole chapter is named ‘Preventive
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Measures’, these preventive measures should properly be considered non-criminal justice
responses.182
Money laundering has been the subject of a substantive academic discussion and has
been carefully examined, therefore, it will not be re-examined in this work.183 For the present
purposes it is sufficient to show how this international promotion of domestically originated noncriminal justice responses raises questions about how restricted Transnational Criminal Law is,
as a field of law. Being restricted to the influence of International Law stricto sensu on domestic
penal law, when apparently not only penal law is utilized to counter organized crime, and
domestic law in the field is being influenced by ‘International Soft Law’.
Going after the proceeds of crime
The enormous profit that some individuals have been able to reap from their criminal
activity, despite authorities’ efforts, has been seen as a major problem.184 This profit has been
said to diminish the deterrence of criminal sanction, where the possible profit is such as to make
the punishments appear to be worth the gain.185 Additionally, the prosperity of individuals
involved in criminal activity is seen to serve as an incentive for others to get involved in such
criminal activities and have damaging effect on the society, when members of the society
observed how those that do not adhere to it’s rules prosper from their illicit behaviour.186
Furthermore, the tremendous assets generated by crime creates vast opportunities for further
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criminal activity, where the assets could be used as instruments of crime and to evade detection
and punitive actions.
New strategy evolved in some nation states and at the international level, where the
objective was to go after the proceeds of crime to take away these incentives and instruments of
crime.187
One of these strategies introduced non-conviction based forfeiture, where the state takes
actions outside the criminal justice system to deprive those suspected of criminal activity of their
ill gotten gain. The utilization of non-criminal justice responses to go after the proceeds of crime
as an approach to countering criminal activity, and organized crime in particular, has been
sufficiently examined in academic discussion and it is not considered necessary to re-examine
the approach in this work.188 Therefor, for present purposes it is sufficient to give a short
account of the approach.
Non-Conviction Based Forfeiture
The utilization of non-conviction based forfeiture for the purpose of going after the
proceeds of crime has been said to have originated from efforts of authorities in the United States
of America to counter piracy in the Caribbean in the late 1700s.189 Frequently in those piracy
cases, ship, the cargo and the crew could be seized, but the owner could not be brought to justice.
Consequently, a new enactment was introduced that allowed the government to bring a case in
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rem against the pirate ship itself or its cargo.190 By bringing a forfeiture action against the
properties themselves, the owner was forced to come forward if he wanted to challenge the
forfeiture.
Forfeiture as part of the penal process has been knows since the Roman times. However,
the criminal forfeiture process traditionally utilized to seize profits of crime has its limitations.191
Criminal forfeiture can only be executed following a guilty verdict in a criminal proceeding.
Also, only assets acquired by the crime proven and instruments of that crime can be forfeited
from the defendant, or in some cases the equivalent of the proceeds of the crime in question if
the assets themselves can not be acquired. Additionally, generally only assets of the defendant
himself can be forfeited in the criminal process, not assets of relatives, companies or other
related persons or entities - nor criminal organizations or members of such organizations
suspected of having gained from the criminal actions of the defendant.192 Criminal forfeiture is
by definition a criminal justice response and as such outside the scope of this thesis, the subject
will therefore not be examined further here.
The utilization of non-conviction based forfeiture became common practice in the 1980s
when the approach was found fitting and useful for the drug prohibition enforcement.193 Much
like with the piracy cases of the 18th and 19th century, the mastermind of an international drug
organization and the owner of the drugs and properties used for trafficking or manufacturing
were not readily identified, let alone brought to justice. The approach, now increasingly dealing
with drug enforcement, had to be adjusted to allow for civil forfeiture now dealing with the
seizure and forfeiture of modern day assets; vehicles, businesses, real estates and bank accounts,
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had to be adjusted to modern day basic civil rights.194 Still, it is debated if the proceedings have
reached the point of being compatible with modern day basic rights.195
It is of specific interest for this work how civil forfeiture has been utilized for countering
outlaw motorcycle gangs in Canada, where authorities have seized and forfeited club houses of
gangs such as the Hells Angels MC.196 Many of these cases are still being processed through the
judicial system. Amongst the main issues being debated is the procedural rights that should be
applicable in civil forfeiture cases, and the level of proof required to seize and forfeit assets as
“instruments of unlawful activity” or “proceeds of unlawful activity.”197
The approach of using non criminal justice responses to go after the proceeds of crime
has been further developed to allow for wider variety of ways to go after the suspected criminal
profits. In some countries, including Ireland and the United Kingdom, the approach to go after
criminal profit has been taken one step further, by intertwining in one autonomous agency
multiple efforts for preventing the enjoyment of the proceeds of crime.198 The agency in Ireland
investigates suspicions of criminal profits, forfeit such profits if possible, but alternatively makes
sure it is treated as any other income or asset with regards to revenue law and social benefits.199
The agency is made up of officials from multiple agencies, including the Irish National Police,
the Irish Customs, the Irish Revenue Service and the Department of Social and Family Affairs.200
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The legal framework allows for extensive cooperation of these agencies and information sharing
between them.201
The Irish approach has gained well deserved attention, in particular within the European
Union, where Europol is promoting the Irish model as best practice.202
Considerations relevant for going after proceeds of crime under civil law
A substantive academic discussion has evolved around the subject of non-conviction
based forfeiture and its use to counter organized crime, for present purposes it is sufficient to
give an overview of the discussion.
The argument supporting non-conviction based forfeiture mainly relies on how criminal
profits give incentive and means for further criminal activities, and the argument that crime
should not pay, emphasizing that it is socially harmful if they do.203 The argument claims the
criminal forfeiture process to be insufficient instrument for seizing criminal assets.204
Subsequently, causing criminally obtained assets to be left at the convicts’ disposal or in the
hands of individuals involved in crime, as both an incentive and an instrument for further crime.
In the organized crime context, such assets have been claimed to give high level criminals the
means to commit crime and avoid being held accountable. Subsequently, the forfeiture of these
assets makes them more vulnerable to detection and capture.205
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Consequently, it has been considered necessary to provide the state with further abilities
to seize the profits driving from criminal activities, in particular serious and organized crime.206
This kind of forfeiture has been argued to be a preventive measure and not a punitive one, where
the state is only recovering illegally acquired assets - assets that have arguably never legitimately
became the property of those that acquired them through illegal actions.207
The critics have pointed out that the civil forfeiture remedy has been utilized in cases that
have nothing to do with organized crime and in some cases the crimes can hardly be argued to
have been committed for profit.208 Consequently, undermining the argument that this kind of
approach is necessary for the purpose of countering organized crime kingpins or making sure
crimes do not pay. An example of both would be the forfeiture of a house belonging to a sports
couch guilty of sexually exploiting a teenager, where authorities forfeited the house as an
instrument of the crimes committed there.209
Most importantly though, the critics have argued that non-conviction based forfeiture is
punitive in nature - in fact criminal punishment by another name - and therefore requiring the full
protection of the criminal procedural safeguards.210 Consequently, the main criticism of non-
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conviction based forfeiture has been focused on its incompatibility with human rights guarantied
to those criminally accuse and the sidestepping of criminal procedural safeguards.211
The human rights argument evolves mostly around the right to fair trial for example
under article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.212
A major issue raised with respect to fundamental principles of law has been how the nonconviction based forfeiture is not based on any requirement to establish personal guilt.213 The
authorities generally acting in rem, against the property it self, originally based on the legal
fiction of assigning liability or fault to the property it self.214 This legal fiction is said to be less
relied up on today, replaced by a pragmatic reasoning that authorities must be able to seize
illegally acquired property and property used or intended to be used for criminal purposes even if
requirements for punishment are not, or can not be met.215 Instead of acting against multiple
individuals, some of which might not be easily reachable, actions are taken against the property
and all possible stakeholders given notice and the option to get involved in the proceedings and
defend their interests in the property.
Another major concern has been the appropriateness of ‘balance of probability’ as the
standard of proof instead of the criminal standards of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.216
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Effectively, under this standard of proof the state has only to make it more likely than not for an
asset to be driving from a criminal activity. Specifically so, as there is not presumption of
innocence, the absents of which is another concern that has been raised.217 Together the above
concerns have been argued to create an unfair dilemma for those suspected of holding criminally
obtained assets, having to choose if to defend against the non-conviction based forfeiture and
risk incriminating themselves, or to be able to enjoy their right under the criminal procedural
safeguards to remain silent in regards to related pending or possible criminal charges.218
Finally, the disposal of the forfeited assets has been the subject of some discussion.
Critics have claimed that the practice of having the law enforcement agencies gain from the
forfeiture of criminal assets, might bring the focus of law enforcement authorities on cases where
assets could be forfeited, risking to create a policing for profit incentive.219 The
counterarguments have been that going after the criminal profit can be expensive and therefore
an incentive is needed, also, that the society as a whole suffers harm from crimes and financing
effective law enforcement is a suitable compensation.220 Noticeably, some jurisdictions have
made a policy decision not to have law enforcement agencies benefit from forfeited assets.221
The European Union has taken interest in promoting the approach to go after the
proceeds of crime.222 The Union enacted a directive ‘on the freezing and confiscation of
instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union’ in April 2014. The original
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proposal would have obligated the member states to adopt non-conviction based forfeiture, but
was altered so non-conviction based forfeiture does not have to be introduced except in limited
circumstances where confiscation based on criminal conviction was impossible due to “. . .
illness or absconding of the suspected or accused person,”223.224 Of the 28 member states of the
European Union, only Italy, Ireland and the United Kingdom allow for non-conviction based
forfeiture.225 Never the less, the Commission of the European Union seems to be promoting the
utilization of non-conviction based forfeitures in the absence of criminal conviction.226
As previously stated the main focus of this thesis is not the proceeds of crime approach.
The approach has been substantively discussed in the literature and there is no need to reexamine it in this work. However, the above literature shows how authorities are utilizing noncriminal justice responses in their efforts to deprive criminals of their instruments and proceeds
of crime, in particular when it comes to organized crime. The next subchapter will introduce
literature that shows how non-criminal justice responses are being utilized to counter crime, and
organized crime in particular, in wider context than assets suspected to be instruments or
proceeds of crime.

Wider variety of non-criminal justice responses
	
  
Domestic authorities have utilized a variety of non-criminal justice responses for the
prevention and disruption of criminal activities such as organized crime. Some of these
responses have been discussed in academic literature, while the thesis presupposition is that the
variety of non-criminal justice responses utilized by domestic authorities is insufficiently
portrayed by the academic discussion.
The disruptive and preventive responses seems to have developed from variety of
measures utilized by authorities in New York in the United States of America, to prevent
223
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criminal organizations from participating in publicly funded or regulated businesses, and from
control orders that were originally used at the beginning of this century in the terrorism context
in the United Kingdom.227 Scholars claim control orders to have been initiated to circumvent
legal obstacles for indefinite detention of terrorist suspects.228 Its uptake in the general criminal
context happened only a few years later when these control orders inspired new techniques and
legislations for countering organized crime and anti-social behaviour.229 The new approach was
introduced on account of the difficulties that criminal law tends to have with countering
organized crime on one hand, and on the other hand individual behaviour that is either not
criminal or represented minor offences carrying minor penalties but causes harassment, alarm or
distress to other people.230 The New York approach inspired variety of responses that allow for
serious and organized criminality to be considered in a variety of administrative decision
making, with the objective of preventing or disrupting criminal activity.231
The main discussions in the United Kingdom about non-criminal justice responses has
evolved around so-called Anti-Social Behaviour Orders proposed in 1995 and introduced as part
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Anti-Social Behaviour Order allowed for a court order
imposed on individuals for anti-social behaviour, banning the individual from certain acts or
omission from specific locations, etc. Breach of these orders without a reasonable excuse is a
227
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criminal offence - leading to a criminal justice response.232 A variety of actors; local authorities,
police and other actors can seek the court order.233
This approach has met heavy criticism for circumventing due-process protections under
English Law.234 Primarily the approach was criticized for requiring only the civil standard of
proof of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ and for allowing hearsay witnesses.235 The criticism
echoes the concerns raised over non-criminal justice responses for depriving criminals of assets
suspected of being instruments or proceeds of crime, such as non-conviction based forfeitures,
covered above. The House of Lords decided to raise the standard of proof to almost the same as
in criminal law - ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.236
The implementation of the orders has raised other concerns. Mainly that the term antisocial behaviour is so broadly defined that it has allowed for a rapid growth in the scope of the
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders. The orders have therefore been utilized to counter behaviour that
ranges from being criminal, to activity that could be described as a dispute or nuances between
neighbours.237 Additionally the lack of constraint on the kind of orders that the courts can issue
has been criticized. Due to this lack of limitation, the courts have issued wide ranging
limitations on peoples liberty; sometimes it can even be hard to see the connection between the
order issued and the behaviour intended to prevent.238 Court orders have been introduced to
restrict activity that is neither criminal nor anti-social in themselves, such as entering a building
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taller than four stories high or entering any car park in England or Wales.239 Again, these
concerns are in line with concerns raised over the utilization of non-conviction based forfeitures
and their legal basis lacking restrains on the scope of these responses.
Aside from Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, there are other civil law based court orders
directed at crimes in the UK that are heavily debated. The previously mentioned control orders
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005 are a good example. Scholars have criticized
that the control orders, amounting to limitation of liberty, are being issued while the standard of
proof is only that of ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting’.240
Australian authorities enacted control order legislations in the organized crime context
after a number of violent incidences involving so-called Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (often
referred to as OMG or OMCG). In response, a number of the Australian states introduced
legislation that was tailored to counter the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, sometimes referred to as
the OMCG law. Like in the United Kingdom, and under influence from the United Kingdom,
control orders had previously been introduced in Australia in the terrorist context.241
These legislations are marginally different, but bear though many similarities. These
legislations all provide a process through which organizations can be declared a ‘declared
organization’. The police authorities can then request a court to impose control orders on
members of the declared organization.
These control orders can be wide-ranging. Julie Ayling notes that the control orders are
intended to limit the ability of a controlled person to associate and communicate with specific
other individuals. These other individuals can be members of the same or other declared
organizations, but they can also be non-members. The control orders “. . . may also prohibit the
person from entering or being near certain premises, applying for or undertaking certain
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occupations or possessing specified articles . . .”242 Breach of the control order can bring with it
a criminal punishment of up to five years imprisonment.
These legislations have met criticism for being “draconian and inconsistent with the usual
standards for criminal proceedings”243, particularly caused by evidential and procedural
innovations as noted by Ayling:
“The ire of lawyers, in particular, has been sparked by some evidential and
procedural innovations (varying between the different states’ laws), such as a
requirement for only a civil standard of proof for questions of fact, the
removal of any need to give reasons for declaration decisions, the ousting of
rights of review for decisions about declarations and control orders, and the
reversal of the onus of proof for exemptions from a control order’s
prohibitions on associations.”244
Under the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs legislations an individual can therefore be
criminally punished based on a breach of a control order acquired through civil law procedures.
The standard of proof for having a control order issued is however not the standards of proof
under the criminal law and ‘criminal intelligences’ are allowed.245 The information that the court
bases its decision on, to impose the control order, may even be withheld from the accused.
Likewise, non-criminal justice responses introduced in the Netherlands in recent years
have been developed under influence from the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the United
Kingdom, as well as from administrative responses to organized crime in New York during
Guiliani’s rule as mayor in the 1990’s.246
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Part of this responses has been called the ‘administrative approach’ to prevent organized
crime.247 The initiative is intended to prevent that “. . . services or facilities of the public
administration can be exploited to carry out criminal activities or to invest illegally acquired
capital.”248 In the Netherlands, this involves two main projects.
The BIBOB project is a national initiative based on the BIBOB Act.249 The BIBOB Act
provides a legal basis for “refusal or withdrawal of licenses and subsidies and the refusal of
participation in public tenders or contracts.”250 These refusals or withdrawals are an
administrative decision, made by administrative authorities based on a risk assessment conducted
by a national BIBOB bureau within the Ministry of Justice.251 The act also provides access for
the BIBOB bureau to information that their risk assessment can be based on, from variety of
actors within the administrative branch, police and the judiciary. The scope of the BIBOB Act is
however limited to selected business sectors.
The Van Traa project is an initiative by local authorities after the prescript offered by
Amsterdam’s Red Light District (Wallen) Manager project.252 The project is intended to prevent
the facilitation of organized crime by the administration and to take administrative measures to
bar organized crime from legitimate businesses. Similar projects have been adopted in other
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municipals in the Netherlands.253 The Van Traa project is both limited to specific areas and
business sectors, originally established for the Red Light District in Amsterdam but was later
expanded to other areas within Amsterdam.254 However, the Van Traa project is less restricted
than the BIBOB Act in the sense that its team does not need indications of organized crime
connections to instigate a screening; all businesses in a selected area can be subject to
scanning.255 Additionally, the project is more integrated in the respect that different agencies
work together within the project. Consequently a wider range of measures can be taken:
“. . . these vary from the refusal or withdrawal of licences and permits, the
levying of taxes, the closure of certain establishments, to the instigation of a
criminal investigation, and, under certain circumstances, the acquisition of
real estate by the city itself, all in order to prevent criminals from investing
their money in specific objects.”256
Wim Huisman and Monique Koemans state that it was anticipated that information from
databases of administrative authorities “. . . would provide a first assessment of risk of organized
crime-related activity”.257 They claim, however, that the information from the police and the
judiciary, including criminal intelligence, has become decisive for assessing the risk of a
criminal organization related activity.
Also, administrative authorities do not have the ability to check the origin or reliability of
these information. Furthermore, the BIBOB Act provides limited access to the information on
which decisions are based on, if the information is confidential, limiting the defendants ability to
defend against the decision.258
Additionally, Huisman and Koemans state that the police have started collecting
information, in large criminal investigations, which might be relevant for the decision of
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introducing administrative measures. They claim that judicial authorities use the administrative
approach of the Van Traa project as an alternative to criminal law enforcement, where the police
were unsuccessful in securing a criminal conviction.259 Consequently the authors find that the
distinction between administrative law and criminal law is blurring when it comes to their
application to counter organized crime.260
The second phase of the development of non-criminal justice responses in the
Netherlands came in 2007 when legislation titled ‘severe anti-social behaviour’ was proposed,
introducing measures inspired by the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the United Kingdom.261
The legislation gives local municipal authorities additional powers, and reinforces the existing
powers, to deal with ‘persistent and grave’ anti-social behaviour.262 Under the legislation local
authorities can issue restraining orders as an administrative measure, without having to bring the
matter before the judiciary.263 The injunctions can be based on information from law
enforcement authorities like the police, but they can also come from administrative authorities
like the social services and local educational authorities.264 If the injunction is breached
however, the breach is a criminal act, punishable by fines or imprisonment for up to three
months.265
Wim Huisman and Monique Koemans note that the anti-social behaviour measures in the
Netherlands should be seen as mixture of administrative and criminal law, while the measures in
the United Kingdom are a mixture of civil and criminal law.266
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Both these initiatives, the ‘administrative approach’ to organized crime and the
introduction of civil law control orders, are to be seen as a development in the direction where
policy makers are decreasingly seeing policing and judiciary response as the only feasible
response to anti social and criminal behaviour. Previously, detailed evolvement towards
utilization of non-criminal justice responses for the purpose of depriving criminals of their
instruments and proceeds of crime seem to bear evidence of the same development. Authorities
seem increasingly to consider non-criminal justice responses, such as administrative and civil
law responses, to be necessary to support existing criminal justice efforts intended to counter
problems such as organized crime.267
Scholarly discussions have criticized this change in approach. The repressive feature of
these administrative measures has raised concerns over lack of due process safeguards, compared
to criminal law.268 Dutch legal scholars have reasoned that the procedural rights of criminal law
should apply to administrative measures under the Van Traa project and the BIBOB Act. They
have claimed that by failing to adhere to the criminal standards, the Netherlands are in breach of
the right to fair trial under article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.269
The above coverage of existing literature shows how domestic responses for countering
crime and organized crime in particular are increasingly non-criminal justice responses, as
opposed to the traditional approach of utilizing criminal justice responses to counter criminal
behaviour. Additionally, the existing literature indicates that this development towards noncriminal justice responses might in fact be to some extent affected by policymaking, promotion
and soft law at the international level, contrary to what is the presupposition of this thesis.
Consequently, this study researched if the utilization of non-criminal justice responses to counter
organized crime was in fact being promoted at the international level.
While the existing literature shows variety of non-criminal justice responses intended to
counter substantive criticism and concerns raised, this thesis presupposition is that the variety of
non-criminal justice responses utilized domestically to counter organized crime is in fact much
267
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greater than current academic discussion suggests. Consequently, a research was conducted to
examine the utilization of non-criminal justice responses to outlaw motorcycle gangs, in Canada,
Germany and Iceland. The research findings will be introduced in the next chapter.
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Domestic Non-Criminal Justice Responses to Organized
Crimes
This chapter will detail the findings of the research conducted. The research had two
phases. The first phase of the research was intended to provide information about non-criminal
justice responses utilized to counter organized crime by domestic law enforcement authorities in
Canada, Germany and Iceland. The second phase of the research was intended to reveal if noncriminal justice responses were being promoted at the international level and if their utilization
by domestic authorities was influencing transnational efforts for countering organized crime.
This phase of the research was limited to the European Union and the United Nations, these
being the main international bodies involved in the suppression of organized crime at the
international level according to the literature review on the system of Transnational Criminal
Law.

Canada
Canadian authorities use four methods that should be considered to be non-criminal
justice responses:
First, deportation under the immigration law of non-citizens that are involved in
organized crime; Second, denial of entry of foreign nationals on the borders on the same
grounds; Third, the use of roadside check stops the police conducts during rides of Outlaw
Motorcycle Clubs from what it appears, mainly for the purpose of information gathering; And
fourth, the use of different legislations to close down clubhouses of Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs.

Deportation
The approach of using deportation to counter organized crime attracted some media
attention in 2011 when Mr. Mark Alistair Stables fought deportation from Canada after having
been found inadmissible based on his organized criminality. Mr. Stables fought the deportation
before the Immigration and refugee board and then brought a case before the Federal Court of
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Canada for a judicial review.270 Both the Immigration and refugee board and the Federal Court
took the matter under careful consideration, offering a detailed coverage of the relevant
arguments and issues that need to be considered for the deportation of an individual based on
organized criminality.
Mr. Stables was a permanent citizen who moved to Canada from Scotland with his
parents at the age of 7 in 1969, he grew up, attended school, lived and worked in Canada after he
arrived. What lead to Mr. Stables’ deportation, started when he arrived on the borders to enter
Canada on November 7th, 2006. Before being allowed to enter, he was interviewed by
Immigration officials.271 On that occasion he was found to have in his possession Hells Angels
MC paraphernalia and related phone numbers. Resulting from this interview, the Immigration
Officer wrote a report of inadmissibility on account of organized criminality.
The Immigration and Refugee board consequently conducted an admissibility hearing.272
Mr. Stables’ membership in the Hells Angels MC was found to be a basis for inadmissibility on
ground of organized criminality under subsection 1 of section 37 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act. Based on that hearing the board member decided that Stables was inadmissible
to Canada, he was consequently issued a deportation order.
The provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act based on which Mr.
Stables was found inadmissible, provides that a permanent resident or a foreign national can be
found inadmissible on grounds of organized criminality for:
“(a) being a member of an organization that is believed on reasonable
grounds to be or to have been engaged in activity that is part of a pattern of
criminal activity planned and organized by a number of persons acting in
concert in furtherance of the commission of an offence punishable under an
Act of Parliament by way of indictment, or in furtherance of the commission
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of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute
such an offence, or engaging in activity that is part of such a pattern; or
(b) engaging, in the context of transnational crime, in activities such as
people smuggling, trafficking in persons or money laundering.”273
Mr. Stables admitted that he was a member in the Hells Angels MC from 2000 but
claimed that he terminated his membership in December 2009, after the organization had denied
him of support for fighting the deportation.274 He, however, denied that the Hells Angels MC
were criminal organization.275 Furthermore, he denied any personal involvement in organized
crime or crime in general, emphasizing the fact that he has no criminal record.
The Immigration and Refugee board and the Federal Court of Canada found it, however,
to be established that the Hells Angels MC were an organization and a criminal organization in
the meaning of the Act. The Federal Court quoted the following conclusion of the board:
“There is enough evidence to prove, on reasonable grounds, a connection
between criminal offences of Hells Angels members, associates and puppet
groups, and the organization. There is evidence of the criminality of its
members. Their criminal acts have included drug trafficking, extortion,
firearms and explosives offences, and the rampancy of such criminal acts are
probative in establishing that the Hells Angels is a criminal organization. It is
also apparent that the affiliation with the Hells Angels furnishes members
with opportunities to be involved in crime at a depth that may not otherwise
be available to them. The panel is also satisfied that the nature and existence
of the hierarchy within the Hells Angels, the influence of its leadership, and
the incumbent obligations of the members and associates to one another, all
foster and under gird the criminal event. This is also an organization that
relishes in the power and notoriety of its members, and will employ violence
and intimidation to preserve its power and enhance its reputation. It
273

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, section 37.
‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed
on 10 July 2012, para 2. ‘Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Stables’, 2010 CanLII 96602
(IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/fpt1z> Accessed on 3 July 2012, para 149.
275
‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed
on 10 July 2012, para 11.
274

62

maintains the sanctuary or fortress of a Hells Angels clubhouse to minimize
criminal exposure and infiltration.”276
The judge in Stables’ case before the Federal Court of Canada states “it is undeniable that
Courts have often upheld a very broad application of subsection 37(1), on the basis that such an
interpretation was consistent with Parliament’s objective to ensure the security of Canadians”.277
The judge never the less finds the term neither to be impermissibly vague nor overbroad, stating
the terms in the article “though quite broad and open-ended, are not without limit and do provide
sufficient guidance for a legal debate”278.279
The judge specifically noted that Mr. Stables had not even tried to challenge the findings
of Hells Angels MC involvement in organized crime activity or endeavour to show them to be
unreasonable in his request for a judicial review by the Federal Court.280
The federal judge, like the Immigration and Refugee board, found that Mr. Stables was
not an “innocent” member that did not know the nature of the organization he was joining until it
was too late. On the contrary he found that due to his long standing membership during which
he held senior positions in the organization Mr. Stables knew the nature of the organization,
finding that “either he did not care or choose to be willfully blind to its activities”.281
To establish inadmissibility, evidence must be lead to prove the organized criminality up
to the standard of “reasonable ground to believe” under section 37 (1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.282 The board cited the Federal Court of Canada case Chiau v. Canada:
276

‘Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Stables’, 2010 CanLII 96602 (IRB),
<http://canlii.ca/t/fpt1z> Accessed on 3 July 2012, para 116. As cited in: ‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed on 10 July 2012, para 36.
277
‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed
on 10 July 2012, para 45.
278
‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed
on 10 July 2012, para 51.
279
‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed
on 10 July 2012, para 38 – 53.
280
‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed
on 10 July 2012, para 37.
281
‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed
on 10 July 2012, para 37. On Mr. Stables position, involvement and knowledge of the organization and its
activities, see: ‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII),
<http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed on 10 July 2012, para 2, 6, 7 and 44.
282
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, Section 33 and 37.

63

“[t]he standard of proof required to establish “reasonable grounds” is more
than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the civil test of balance of probabilities.
And, of course, a much lower threshold than the criminal standard of
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” It is a bona fide belief in a serious possibility
based on credible evidence.”283
The Federal Court of Canada took under consideration two issues relevant to this study in
Mr. Stables’ application for judicial review.284 First, whether the legislative scheme described in
section 37 violated his rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association under the
Canadian Charter of rights. Second, whether section 37 of the Act deprived Mr. Stables of right
to life, liberty and security of the person in a manner that is not in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.
The court found that section 2 of the Canadian Charter of rights does not protect Mr.
Stables right to join the Hells Angels MC, given the violent and criminal activities of that
organization.285 Noting as basis for its decision the Supreme Court of Canada case Suresh v
Canada.
“It is not in dispute that freedom of expression does not protect expressive
activity that take the form of violence. Violence or criminal activity do not
involve any of the recognized rationales underlying the constitutional
protection of freedom of expression, namely its role as an instrument of
democratic government, of truth and of personal fulfilment. Similarly,
freedom of association has been found to encompass only lawful activities
and cannot protect a person who chooses to belong to a criminal
organization.”286
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The court furthermore found that due to Mr. Stables long standing membership during
which he held senior positions in the organization, Mr. Stables knew the nature of the
organization and could not claim to be an ‘innocent’ member.287
With regards to principles of fundamental justice Mr. Stables’ claimed that the terms
‘membership’ and ‘criminal organization’ were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The
court found first that Mr. Stables could in this particular case not claim protection under section
7 of the Canadian Charter of rights - as the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 are
not independent rights - but can only be considered after it has been established that an
individual is being deprived of life, liberty or security of the person.288 Still the court decided to
examine the arguments and finds the threshold to have been set by the Supreme Court of Canada
in R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society. Accordingly:
“a law will only be found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision
as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate. Absolute certainty is not
necessary, so long as citizens have a broad understanding of what is
permissible and what is not.”289
The court finds it undeniable that “Courts have often upheld a very broad application of
subsection 37(1), on the basis that such an interpretation was consistent with Parliament’s
objective to ensure the security of Canadians.”290 The court finds however that even if the terms
are broad and open ended, they are not without limitations and do provide sufficient guidelines
for a legal debate.291 Therefore the terms fall short of being impermissibly vague.
Mr. Stables’ case shows the Canadian Immigration and Refuge Protection Act to be used
to deport individuals on basis of organized criminality and how low level of involvement and
proof is needed for the implementation of such deportation. Even more interestingly Mr.
Stables’ case, as well as a few additional cases should be seen to indicate that Canadian
287
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authorities are in some cases opting to deport non-citizens suspected of involvement in organized
crime instead of criminally charging them for such involvement.292 This raises the concern if
deportation is sought where evaluation of the evidence concludes then not to be strong enough to
prove organized criminality up to the standard of the criminal law.

Denial of entry
The case of Collins v Canada before the Immigration and Refugee board is an example of
a case where a foreign national is stopped at the borders and found inadmissible for reasons of
organized criminality.293 The application for judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada was
rejected.
Mr. Collins arrived at the Canadian border station from the United States.294 Mr. Collins
claims that he did not intend to enter Canada, but had not realized he was approaching a border
station until he could not turn around because how the road was constructed. He claims to have
informed the immigration officers of this as soon as he arrived at the border station and asked to
be allowed to turn around, without entering Canada. Mr. Collins was wearing clothing bearing
the insignia of the Bandidos MC, a well known Outlaw Motorcycle Club, when he arrived at the
borders. He was not allowed to turn around but asked if he had any weapons. He admitted to be
carrying a gun, which he had a permit for. He was consequently arrested and brought into
detention in Canada.295
An immigration officer then wrote a report of inadmissibility under article 44 of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, claiming him to be inadmissible on grounds of
organized criminality, based on his involvement with the Bandidos MC.
The Immigration and Refugee board consequently conducted an admissibility hearing.296
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Mr. Collins conceded to that he was a member of a specific chapter of the Bandidos MC
and that the Bandidos were an organization, “like the Boy Scouts”.297
The hearing proceeded to examine if the Bandidos MC were a criminal organization,
finding reasonable grounds to believe the association to be a criminal organization.298
Based on Collins’ acknowledgment that he was a member of Bandidos MC, found to be a
criminal organization, Mr. Collins was found inadmissible on the grounds of organized
criminality and deported.299
It can be seen from Mr. Collins’ case that Immigration authorities can detain an
individual that arrives at Canada’s borders, upon suspicion of his organized criminality, and
bring him to a hearing where he could be found inadmissible to Canada. Should the individual
be found inadmissible, he cannot return to Canada, except by way of specific permission.300
Inadmissibility can be based on mere membership in an organization if there are found to
be reasonable grounds to believe the organization in question is involved in crimes301 or, in the
absence of such membership, on the grounds of participation and involvement in the activities of
such organization.302 The standard of proof for findings of fact for such organized criminality is
“reasonable grounds to believe”.303

The check stops
Canadian authorities have used so-called “Check Stops” to be able to stop motorists they
suspect of being involved in organized crime, especially Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs. The police
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has executed these Check Stops as traffic security monitoring, based on provisions of the
Highway Traffic Act.304
In the cases examined, the police intended these Check Stops to be conducted for
multiple purposes in addition to highway safety concerns, including the purpose of gathering
intelligence.305 Showing strong police presence and inconspicuously collecting information
about those that were attending specific gatherings seems also to have been intended to reduce
the risk of crimes to occur, as those in attendance would know that their presence was known and
that a strong and rapid police response was to be expected.
It is in any case evident that the police intended to use powers provided to them by law to
conduct Check Stops for purposes other than the legislator intended for when enacting the law
providing these powers. Intending to utilize police powers, intended to enhance traffic safety,
for the additional purpose of countering organized crime.
The two cases examined reached contradictory conclusions as to the question whether the
use of the Check Stops was lawful and withstands Constitutional scrutiny. A full diagnosis of
the cases, that potentially could explain these different conclusions, is not necessary for present
purposes. For the purpose of this work it is deemed sufficient to assess if Canadian authorities
have had and still have the option of using Check Stops as parts of their efforts to counter
organized crime.
In R. v. McCurrach the detention and photographing at the Check Stops was found to be
unconstitutional, while in Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board the
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detention and videotaping at the Check Stops was found lawful and withstand constitutional
scrutiny.306
In both cases the judges examined and rejected the Crowns claim that the Police act or
the common law gave the police power for the detention at the Check Stops.307
The judge in R. v. McCurrach carefully examined the evidence showing that the police
had multiple purposes for conducting the Check Stop, and assessed the weight he saw the police
put on the different purposes. The judge found the highway security concerns to have been
minimal and merely a means to an end - to justify the introduction of the Check Stop for the
furtherance of the real purposes for the stop.308 The judge found, therefore, that the detention
was in fact not made on grounds of Highway security concerns, making the detention under the
Highway Traffic Act unlawful, even if such detention if made primarily based on highway
security concerns could have been lawfully made under the Act.309
The judge in Brown pursues a different line of reasoning. He rejects that other purposes
in addition to the highway security concerns should render the stop and detention unlawful,310
citing the Supreme Court of Canada case R. v. Storrey that the intention to use a lawful detention
to further other legitimate purposes did not make a detention unlawful.311 Except only if: the
additional police purposes are illegal; have nothing to do with the execution of a police officer’s
public duty; infringe the liberty or security of the detained person beyond that contemplated by
the purpose that is the basis for the detention; or are in other ways improper.312 The judge gives
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examples of unlawful additional purposes such as stopping persons of colour or conducting an
unconstitutional search.313
The judge in Brown states that he agrees with the trial judge that “. . . known criminals
should not be more immune from s. 216(1) stops than law abiding citizens who are not known to
the police.”314 Additionally he find that the “gathering of police intelligence is well within the
ongoing police duty to investigate criminal activity”. He therefore finds the police to be allowed
to use the opportunity produced at the Check Stop.315
Brown has been cited, as having established the principle “that a lawful police interest
beyond highway safety concerns”316 does not taint a lawful stop based on the Highway Traffic
Act.317 While the Supreme Court of Canada has cited Brown as establishing the same, the court
has emphasized that “[a] valid regulatory purpose, whether predominant or not, would not
sanitize or excuse a Charter violation.”318
An additional consideration was how those that were stopped at the Check Stops were not
randomly selected. The police decided time and place of the stops on basis of information about
activities of specific Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and the police stopped only those that were
considered to be members of, or involve with outlaw motorcycle gangs.319
The judge of the Provincial court of Alberta in R. v. McCurrach found that the targeting
of the Hells Angels MC at the Check Stops was arbitrary.320 The judge found the police had not
been able to provide reasonable and probable grounds for their claim that the Hells Angels MC
were involved in crime as a group.321 The judge noted that none of those stopped at the Check
Stop had been charged for participation in a criminal organization under the criminal law. Based
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on this he found that the targeting of the Hells Angels MC was unreasonable, suggesting that it
was arbitrary.322
In Brown the judge found that the police had sufficient cause to stop the appellants and
additionally that reasonable cause was not needed as the stop was lawfully made under the
Highway Traffic Act, which does not require cause.323 The judge was satisfied that members of
the Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs were more prone to violations that compromised highway safety
than the general public.324 Agreeing with the trial judge, that the police had information that
raised reasonable grounds to believe that an identifiable group raised particular highway safety
concerns. Also agreeing that the selective criteria was not “tainted by any coexisting improper
purpose.”325
At last the judge in Brown examined specifically the videotaping by the police of the
Check Stops. The judge accepted the Crowns submission that the videotaping was not improper
nor did it violate any rights of the individuals stopped. Noting that the videotaping was
conducted without any secrecy, in a public place and did not in any way affect the length nor
condition of the detentions.326 The judge referred to Ontario Court of Appeal case R. v. Parsons
where the judge accepted that videotaping by the police was an example of the use of modern
technology by the police, neither illegal nor intrusive upon the person in question.327
However, in R. v. McCurrach the judge found that the coerced taking of videos and still
photos of the detained individuals, by the police at the Check Stop, amounted to an unlawful
seizure of permanent records.328
The factual differences of the two cases can, however, explain these different findings.
In Brown the videotaping discussed in that case were not found to affect the condition of the
detention. In R. v. McCurrach the police made the detained persons remove their helmets,
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sunglasses, scarfs, etc., which the judge found to have been to facilitate the taking of the
individuals photos, for intelligence purposes.329 This makes the additional police purposes seem
more intrusive for the detained person beyond that contemplated by the purpose that is the basis
for the detention, the traffic security concerns.
The conclusion is that the police in Canada are able to use Check Stops based on the
Highway Traffic Act for the purpose of countering organized crime, where the selected groups
being stopped pose genuine highway security concerns. This seems possible to argue in the case
of outlaw motorcycle gangs and other identifiable groups, if for example drug and alcohol
consumption can be shown to be particularly common among members.
At a Check Stop the police can then seize the opportunity to pursue other lawful and
proper purposes within their spear of duty. Other proper and legitimate purposes might be
intelligence gathering related to organized crime or crime in general. However, these additional
purposes can not cause more interference to the detained person than needs be for the purpose of
the highway traffic security concerns. This use of the Check Stops should be considered not
only legitimate but necessary for the police to perform their “essential role” of investigating
crime.330
News coverage shows that police in Canada continues to use Check Stops based on the
Highway Traffic Act as part of their efforts to counter outlaw motorcycle gangs.331

Administrative approach
Authorities in Canada, on occasions, take an administrative approach to countering
organized crime. Example of this is the efforts undertaken by authorities to close down the
activities of the Bacchus MC’s clubhouse in Saint John, New Brunswick and efforts of
authorities in Ontario to revoke the liquor licence of a known member of the Hells Angels MC.
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According to media coverage the Bacchus MC chapter of Saint John moved out of their
clubhouse due to a “do not occupy” order the police sought from the fire marshal’s office.332
The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada considers Bacchus MC an outlaw motorcycle
gang with strong connections with the Hells Angels MC.333
After an incident close to the clubhouse, the president of the Bacchus MC was charged
with second degree murder. As part of the criminal investigation that followed, the police
obtained a search warrant for the clubhouse. Based on that warrant, the police offered city
officials to examine the facilities, in what seems to have been an effort to use administrative
powers to bar the group from using this particular facilities.334 The city officials that the police
invited to inspect the premises found “various deficiencies” under “various acts”.335
Subsequently, he police obtaining a “do not occupy” order.
This seems to be an administrative effort to remove specific activities or specific group
from a specific area rather than routine law enforcement in relation to housing in general or
clubhouses in particular. This assumption is supported by a statement given by the Saint John
police: "We told them we were going to use every means possible to remove them from this area
and as a result of that, they are moving voluntarily. We haven't evicted them."336 This
assumption is also supported by the words of Saint John city councillor who claims he was
assured by the police that the Bacchus MC were moving out of the city.337 He also praised the
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police for their effort, not only to relocate the club, but also to relocate the club out of the city of
Saint John.
Additionally, the police were working on getting the Bacchus MC permanently removed
from the property on basis of a Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods legislation.338
The ‘Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods legislation is of specific interest to this
study as it is a legislation that provides non-criminal justice responses to counter variety of social
problems both criminal and non criminal, including organized crime. The legislation provides
for a community safety order to be made to prevent activities on or near a property, from
adversely affecting a community or neighbourhood, if the activities indicate that the said
property “. . . is being habitually used for a specified use.”339 “ [S]pecified use” is detailed in
article 1 paragraph 1, and can, for example, be the commission or promotion of a criminal
organization offence, or accommodation, aid, assistance or support of criminal organization or its
activities.340
The order can prohibit individuals from continuing the said activity, require any or all
persons to vacate the property, prohibit them from re-entering or re-occupying the property.341
The order can also require authorities to close the property from use and occupation for a period
of up to 90 days.342
Also, according to the Act, fortified buildings can be designated as a threat to public
safety, providing a basis for ordering such fortifications to be removed.343 Clubhouses of outlaw
motorcycle clubs are known for being fortified.
Police and city authorities in Saint John jointly used administrative measures in an effort
to prevent or at least discouraging a specific association, considered to be involved in organized
crime, from operating in the city of Saint John.
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Administrative measures are therefore considered by this study to be available to, and
used by, Canadian authorities for the purpose of countering organized crime.

Licensing
Considering involvement in criminal organizations such as outlaw motorcycle gangs as
part of the criteria for issuing or revoking licences is another example of the administrative
approach in Canada.
In 2010, the Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario applied to the
Board of the Commission to revoke Mr. Barletta’s liquor licence for his bar, ‘the Famous Flesh
Gordon’s’. The Registrar claimed that on account of his membership in the Hells Angels MC,
Mr. Barletta failed to fulfill one of the requirements for being issued a license to sell liquor in the
first place, allowing the Registrar to revoke the licence under section 15 of the Liquor Licence
Act.344 The requirement that Mr. Barletta is considered to fail to fulfill on account of his
membership in the Hells Angels MC is described in subsection 2(d) of section 6:
“(d) the past or present conduct of the persons referred to in subsection (3) affords
reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in
accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty;”345
However, he Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario did not find Mr.
Barletta’s membership in the Hells Angels MC as such to cause him to fail to fulfill the
requirement. The board found that his membership as such was not criminal and that the
Registrar had to prove the alleged criminal activity of Mr. Barletta to be able to revoke his
licence on grounds of “past conduct” under previously mentioned section of the Act.346
The Board emphasized that there were no reasons to consider Mr. Barletta to have acted
impropriety in operating his licensed establishment nor were there reasons to think he will not
comply to these rules in the future.
344
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The decision was appealed on the basis that the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming
Commission had erred in Law.347 The Court of Appeal for Ontario accepted the appeal and
found the Board to have erred in Law, after an unsuccessful appeal to the District Court.
First, the Court of Appeal found that the Board had erred in applying the standard of
proof on ‘balance of probability’, instead of the appropriate lower standard of ‘reasonable ground
for belief’.348 Second, that the Board erred in interpreting too narrowly the test for determining if
a licence should be revoked.349 The Court found the Board to have considered primarily Mr.
Barletta’s conducts that had to do with his operation of his licensed establishment and
compliance with relevant law and regulations.350 When in fact the Board would have been right
to consider his conducts well beyond his operation of the licensed establishment, as well as his
compliance with the law generally and his integrity and honesty. The court noted the legislative
intent behind the Act to be “. . . to ensure that licensed establishments will be operated by those
who can be counted on to properly serve the public interest, . . .”351
The Court of Appeal did, however, not accept that if the Board had proceeded correctly,
revocation would have been the only reasonable conclusion that it could have reached.352 The
Court of Appeal’s ruling was, therefore, to send the Registrar’s application for revoking Mr.
Barletta’s liquor licence back to the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario
for reconsideration in accordance with the courts guidance as to the Law.353
In it’s ruling, the Court can be seen to reject the Board’s decision that mere membership
in a criminal organization could not establish a ground for revoking a licence based on the past
or present conduct provision of section 6(2)(d). Also, the Court rejects that the Registrar needs
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to prove criminal activity of the licensee or applicant, pointing out that the standard of proof is
only reasonable ground to believe and that conduct that is not criminal may also provide the
grounds for such reasonable ground to believe.354 Furthermore, the Court of Appeal seems to
invite the Board to evaluate if a membership in a criminal organization establishes “. . .
reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in accordance with the
law and with integrity and honesty;”355 under the court’s guidance of the required standard of
proof and the appropriate interpretation of the legislative test.356
Mr. Barletta appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Canada, who dismissed the
appeal.

357

Consequently, the Ontario’s Licence Appeal Tribunal issued a decision on October

6th 2014, where Mr. Barletta’s liquor licence was revoked.358 The tribunal found that Mr.
Barletta’s membership in the Hells Angel’s MC, found to be a criminal organization, provided
grounds for revoking his licence.359 Finding his devotion to the club and it rules, requiring him
to put the interests of the club above everything else, established reasonable grounds to belief
that he will not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty. Mr.
Barletta appealed the decision of the Ontario’s Licence Appeal Tribunal to the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal after a hearing.360
Mr. Barletta’s case suggests that authorities in Canada can reject liquor license to
individuals on grounds of their membership in criminal organization such as the Hells Angels
MC, as providing grounds to believe that an individual “. . . will not carry on business in
accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty;”361.
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Considering affiliation with criminal organizations when making administrative decisions
such as licenses applications should be seen as a mobilization of administrative law for
countering organized crime. The efforts bear some similarities to the administrative approach in
the Netherlands, discussed in the literature review chapter.362

Summary of Non-Criminal Justice Responses found to be used in Canada
Authorities in Canada can detain an individual that arrives at its borders and find him
inadmissible to Canada, on basis of his organized criminality. They are also able to deport a
non-citizen that is within the borders on the same grounds, even if he is a permanent resident.
Such inadmissibility can be based on mere membership in organizations if the
organization in question is involved in crimes363 or, in the absence of such membership, on the
grounds of participation and involvement in the activities of such organizations.364 Also the
standard of proof for finding inadmissibility on grounds of organized criminality is “reasonable
grounds to believe” and not the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.365
Additionally the police in Canada are able to and use Check Stops based on the Highway
Traffic Act for the purpose of stopping groups considered to be involved in organized crime,
where the selected group being stopped pose genuine highway security concerns. At a Check
Stops the police can then seize the opportunity to pursue other lawful and proper purposes within
their sphere of duty, such as intelligence gathering related to organized crime or crime in general.
These other purposes can however not cause more interference to the detained person than needs
be for the purpose of the highway traffic security concerns.
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Finally Canadian authorities seem to be utilizing an administrative approach to counter
organized crime. Safe Communities and Neighbourhoods legislations have been enacted to give
municipal authorities powers to prevent properties within the municipal from being used by
those considered to be involved in organized crime activities. Also, powers of the fire marshal
and other municipal authorities seem to be used for similar preventive purposes. Finally,
Canadian authorities can be seen to be introducing membership in criminal organizations as a
consideration in administrative decision making such as public licensing. However, it should be
noted here that the latter two examples of administrative approach to counter organized crime
can not be seen to have been enacted with the intention of being utilized for countering organized
crime.

Germany
Germany is most noteworthy for the scope of this study for its efforts to ban criminal
organizations. The only nation state known to this study to have banned Outlaw Motorcycle
Clubs under civil law, on grounds of activity of it’s members.

Banning Associations
The first case where an organization, perceived to be a criminal organization, was banned
as an effort to counter organized crime was the banning of the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.”
by the Federal Minister of the Interior in 1983.366 Followed by the banning of “MC Hells Angels
Germany Chapter Düsseldorf” by the Ministry of the Interior of the State of North RhineWestphalia in 2000.367 Since then media coverage shows that German authorities have
continued to ban motorcycle clubs that they claim to be involved in criminal activity and
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organized crime, predominantly clubs that are part of the Hells Angels MC or the Bandidos
MC.368
Both the Hells Angels MC and the Bandidos MC are considered to be outlaw motorcycle
gangs. At the annual meeting of the 16 Ministers of Interior and the Federal Minister of Interior
in May 2010, the Ministers of Interior reached a consensus of a nation wide ban on the Hells
Angels MC and the Bandidos MC.369 At the time this is written it seems that such a nation wide
ban has not yet been put in place.
German authorities have banned the clubs under article 9 of the Basic Law (the German
constitution). Article 9 protects the freedom of association and outlines the restrictions to that
same right. The second paragraph of article 9 prohibits associations that have aims contrary to
the criminal law, or who’s activities are such as to contravene the criminal code. The provision
says: “Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws, or that are directed
against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, shall be
prohibited.”370
Based on article 9 of the Basic Law, article 3 of the Association Act (the Act Regulating
Public Association from 5 August 1964) authorizes to dissolve associations whose aims or
activities are found to be contrary to the criminal law. Dissolving an association requires,
according to article 3, an administrative decision of the ministry of interior, but the law provide
for a judicial review of the decision.371
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The scope of the ban is wide as it also bans other organizations from continuing the
efforts of the banned association and the forming of substitute or replacement organizations.372
The Act furthermore allows for seizure and confiscation of properties of the banned
association.373
The first ban was the Federal Minister of the Interior decision to dissolve the “Hells
Angels MC Hamburge.V.” in 1983. The decision was appealed to the Federal Administrative
Court. The appeal was brought forward on three separate grounds.
The first ground for appeal was lack of jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.
Additionally, if the federal ministry had jurisdiction under the statute, such jurisdiction was
claimed to be unconstitutional.
The court found the Federal Minister of the Interior to have jurisdiction, based on the
court’s finding that the activity of the association extended beyond a single German Lander.374
The court also found the jurisdiction to be constitutional, with reference to its previous case
law.375
The second ground was that the banning order was unlawful, as the plaintiff had not been
heard before it was made. The court found this not to make the banning order unlawful, citing
the German Administrative Proceedings Act that a hearing can be dispensed of where immediate
decision appears necessary in the public interest.376
The third ground for appeal was that the requirements for imposing the ban were not met.
The plaintiffs argued that three requirements for the ban were not met. First, claiming that the
criminal acts of the members were not based on the association’s objective and the acts did not
constitute activities of the association. Second, that it should affect the decision of dissolving the
372
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association that the “Hells Angels MC Hamburge.V.” was not found to be a criminal association
in the meaning of article 129 paragraph 1 in a resent criminal proceedings. Finally, no facts were
claimed to support that the association had wanted to conceal offences committed by its
members.
The court declared that the initiative of criminal proceedings is not required to establish
that an association contravenes the criminal law for the purpose of banning it under article 9
paragraph 2 of the Basic law. Also, the court notes how the banning offence of article 9 of the
Basic Law was differently framed from Article 129 paragraph 1 of the German Criminal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch - StGB).
Furthermore, the court explains the purpose of the banning offence, as not intended as an
additional sanction for criminal acts of individual persons, but rather intended to:
“counteract a particular threat to public safety or order resulting from the
founding or continuation of an organisation from which criminal acts are
planned or committed. Such organisations constitute a particular threat to the
legal interests protected by the criminal law. They have an inherent dynamic
of their own and an organised potential in terms of resources and persons,
which facilitate and favour criminal behaviour. At the same time, the
individual member’s feeling of responsibility is frequently reduced,
individual inhibitions about committing offences are destroyed and there is a
stimulus to commit further offences.”377
The court acknowledged that legal interests of the community, protected by the criminal
law, can be particularly threatened by organizations that contravene the criminal law.
The court found the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” to be an association for the
purpose of the banning provision, based inter alia on the fact of it being registered as such.378
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The court proceeded by examining whether the criminal conducts of the members can be
attributed to the association. The court explained that despite lack of criminal capacity, as only
natural person have criminal capacity, associations can contravene the criminal law.379
Furthermore, that through its members and the club officers, an association can form a group
intent that is separate from that of the individual member. This group intent allows the
association its own purpose and to act independently. The court acknowledged that an
association could have more than one such purpose at the same time, legal, illegal or criminal.
Also the court noted that criminality needs not to be the main purpose or activity of the
association, nor does it have to be on a permanent basis.
The court made it clear that an association can be found unlawful, based on the acts of its
members when they commit criminal acts spontaneously and based on their own decision.380
Such a finding could be based on acts of the members if they repeatedly act as unified
association, so from the outside the criminal acts appear to be activities of the association and the
association is aware of and approves this fact or at least accepts it without contradiction.381 The
court additionally noted that criminal behaviour on the part of the club members could also be
attributed to the association if the association attempts to cover it up by offering the members its
own assistance or assistance from other members.382
Interestingly, the court here found that the association can become accountable ‘after the
fact’ by supporting activities of its members, without the association as such having initially
participated in its commission or the decision to commit these acts. The court explained what
constitutes such a support. Neither needs such support to be formally decided or directed at the
commission of specific offences. Nor, is such support determined from a criminal law point of
view, such as reference to participation or assistance in criminal acts.383 The court stated that it
is sufficient that it is made clear to the members or the public, especially to the victims of the
offences, that the association will support its members in relation to the offences.384
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After having explained in this way how an association can contravene the criminal law
for the purpose of a ban under article 9 of the Basic Law, the court found the “Hells Angels MC
Hamburg e.V.” to contravene the criminal law.385
The court accepts the purpose of the association as stated in the article of the association
the ‘pursuit of the sport of motorcycling’.386 However, the court claims there to be an additional
objective of offering full supports to its members in their criminal offences.
The court notes that all and every member declares support and solidarity to all and every
other member - support and solidarity that is also publicly declared and displayed. Due to this
publicly declared support and solidarity, the court found non-members reasonably to think, that
the acts of individual members would be supported by all the other members.387 Furthermore the
court found this to give the members confidence of the support of their fellow members for their
acts, criminal or not. The court also noted that members of the association, by their violent
behaviour, created a reputation for themselves as a violent group. This reputation was used
effectively, by individual members in committing offences, where the reputation would
intimidate non-members and ensure compliance.388 The court found it clear that all the members
of the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” knew of the violent acts committed by members of the
association as Hells Angels and the reputation the association acquired as a consequence of these
acts.389 The court found that the association did not try to counteract this reputation.390 The
court gives account of how members holding leading role within the association failed to
condemn the violence and, in some cases, supported or lead the violent activity.391
Finally the court notes how the club had prepared a list of lawyers stating which lawyer
was to represent which members when necessary; this the court found to be evidence of the
members’ criminal defence being organized in advance.392 Based on these findings, the court
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found that the association had supported the criminal activity of its members, which is sufficient
on its own to constitute a banning offence.393
Consequently, the court finds the purpose and activities of the “Hells Angels MC
Hamburg e.V.” to contravened the criminal law. Based on its finding that individual criminal
offences of the members were seen, for external purposes, as activities of the “Hells Angels MC
Hamburg e.V.” and accepted by the association. Additionally, based on the court’s finding that
the association supported the criminal activity of its members.394
The court seems to agree with the Hamburg Landgericht judgment that it is not possible
to establish that activities of the group were planed or that a group intent was formed.395
However, this is not found to be necessary for a banning offence.
The court finds the ban to be in accordance with the principle of proportionality and finds
no reason to take any less severe measure against the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.”396
The ban on the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” is therefore upheld by the court.397
The second case examined was the decision by the Ministry of the Interior of the State of
North Rhine-Westphalia to dissolve the “MC Hells Angels Germany Chapter Düsseldorf” in the
year 2000.
The ministry, like the judge in the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” case, finds the
criminal activities to have been known, accepted and supported by the association.398
Consequently the association is found to contravene the criminal law and banned.
However the ministry of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia reaches further than its
federal counterpart in its decision, by claiming that offences were planned at the association’s
393
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meetings and qualify as organized crime.399 This would suggest that a common intent was
formed by the members and that the members, and others, committed offences on the
organizations behalf.
The ministry claims these activities can only be prevented by banning the association and
that lesser measures are insufficient.400 The ministry argues that criminal activity is the main
source of income for the association and therefore a ban on the activities of the association will
not effectively change its objectives or prevent the criminal activities of the association or its
members.
Furthermore, the ministry claims the expected criminal conviction of the association’s
leading members cannot be expected to become effective in changing the objective of the
association or stop the illegal activity.401 The ministry claims the way the association supports
its incarcerated members as well as the support they get through connections with other Hells
Angels chapters are the reasons for this assessment. This arrangement is said to allow
incarcerated members to rely on the support of the association while they serve time in prison.402
The ministry claims this support is financed by illegal activity and therefore the illegal activity
will have to continue to maintain the support.403

Summary of Non-Criminal Justice Responses found to be used in Germany
The only Non-Criminal Justice Response to organized crime in Germany that this study
was able to find sufficient evidence for was the ban on organizations that contravene the criminal
laws.
Under German law, organizations can contravene the criminal law, even though only
natural persons can have criminal capacity.404 However, criminal conducts of its members can
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be contributed to the organization, allowing the organization to form purpose and act
independently from its individual members.405 Criminal conduct of members can be attributed to
the organization if, from the outside, the criminal acts appear to be activities of the association
and the association is aware of and approves this fact or at least accepts it without
contradiction.406 Also, criminal behaviour on the part of the club members can be attributed to
the association if the association covers it up by offering the members its own assistance or
assistance from other members.407 Furthermore, criminality needs not to be the main purpose or
the main activity of the association, nor does it have to be on a permanent basis.
The purpose of a ban is to prevent the “. . . threat to legal interests protected by the
criminal law . . .”408 posed by organizations that contravene the criminal law. The purpose is
therefore not punitive and the ban is not intended to be an additional sanction for criminal acts of
individual persons.

Iceland
This study found two approaches to be utilized to counter organized crime in Iceland that
are not based on criminal justice responses. The most frequently used measures are based on
border control, where known members of alleged criminal organizations have been denied entry
into Iceland, based on restrictions to their treaty based “right” of entry. Also, evidence were
found of an administrative approach for disrupting activities of organizations considered to be
involved in organized crime.

Border control
Icelandic authorities stopped 19 individuals on its borders in 2002 based on their
involvement with the Hells Angels MC. Eleven individuals were denied entry on the ground of
their criminal record. The Directorate of Immigration decided the day after to deny the
remaining eight individuals of entry, based on the Act on control of Foreigners No 45 from
405
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1965.409 They were subsequently arrested and escorted by police back to Denmark from where
they came.
Statements given by officials to the media, suggest that the involvement of these
individuals with the Hells Angels MC association was a deciding factor. Stefán Eiríksson, then
director at the Ministry of Justice, stated that Icelandic authorities intended to use all available
measures to counter organized crime activities, including activities of the Hells Angels MC.410
Sólveig Pétursdóttir, the Minister of Justice stated that there was a wide solidarity between
administrative institutions in Iceland to fight organized crime activities with all available
measures, including activities that thrive within the Hells Angels MC.411 Haraldur Johannessen
the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police stated that the police considered the Hells
Angels MC to be an organized criminal group and other members of the Hells Angels MC could
expect similar measures to be taken.412
Similar measures were taken against members of the Hells Angels MC and their support
clubs in November 2007 and March 2009.413 Press releases show that these measures were
intended to counter organized crime in Iceland.414
Iceland is a member of the Schengen treaty and the European Economic Area (EEA).
The Schengen treaty abolished border control on the internal borders of the member states. The
European Economic Area was established by an agreement that expands the four freedoms of the
European Union – the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital - to the three
member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), that are not members of the
409
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European Union.415 Consequently, the EFTA member states are obligated to adapt their
legislations to the European Union’s legislations in these fields, to guarantee equal rights and
obligations for citizens and economic operators in the European Economic Area.416
Consequently, the reintroduction of border control on Iceland’s internal borders with the
Schengen states and the denying of entry to Schengen citizens had to be in accordance with
exceptions and limitations allowed for in the treaties of the Schengen and the European
Economic Area.417 In a notification to the European Commission in 2009, Iceland states that the
border control is being reintroduced for reasons of “. . . specific threat to the public order and the
national security of Iceland, . . .”.418 The intended aim is declared to: “. . . prevent the entry of
potentially defined group of dangerous persons from and via neighbouring European
countries”419, the implementation of the border control shows that this defined group was the
Hells Angels MC.420
The measures first received a judicial review in 2010 when Mr. Kristiansen and Mr. Wahl
brought a civil case against Icelandic authorities based on the unlawfulness of their deportation,
after having unsuccessfully appealed the decisions of the Directory of Immigration to the
Ministry of the Interior.421
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The District Court of Reykjavík decided upon both cases and cleared Icelandic authorities
of all claims.422 These cases could have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Iceland, but they
were not. The time frame for such appeals has expired and the court’s rulings have therefore
become final in these cases.
The European Court of Human Rights hears cases brought by individuals against its
member states for alleged breach of the Convention. Iceland is a member state, applicants are,
however, required to exhaust domestic remedies before bringing cases before the court; to fulfill
this requirement an appeal to the Supreme Court had to be made.423
The facts of Mr. Kristiansen’s and Mr. Wahl's cases are similar and the rulings by
Reykjavík district court are almost identical, made by the same judge on the same day. This
work will therefore discuss Mr. Kristiansen’s case and only reflect briefly on few distinctive
issues in Mr. Wahl’s case.
The facts of the case are that customs authorities stopped Mr. Kristiansen when he
arrived at the Icelandic borders from Norway on February 8th of 2010.424 He refused to answer
police questioning but dressed himself in a vest with the Hells Angels MC insignia. Mr.
Furuholmen, Mr. Kristiansen’s lawyer who accompanied him, informed that they were to meet
an Icelandic lawyer Mr. Oddgeir Einarsson hdl., and that his client intended to leave the country
the day after.
The National Commissioner of the Police made a risk assessment for Mr. Kristiansen’s
arrival on the day of his arrival. The assessment informs that an Icelandic motorcycle club, MC
Iceland, had the status of a prospect club within the Hells Angels World association and that the
club was seeking full membership.425 The entry process of the Icelandic club is said to be under
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the Norwegian club’s supervision and the assessment concludes that Mr. Kristiansen’s arrival is
related to this entry process, as he is thought to be the president of the Norwegian club.
The assessment claims that organized crime has increased everywhere where the Hells
Angels have established themselves and the emerging of a club in Iceland creates a risk of
increase in organized crime in Iceland and is, therefore, a threat to the society.426 To become full
members, the Icelandic club would have to show that their activity and organization is consistent
with Hells Angels MC requirements. This would increase the risk that the Icelandic members
take up methods and modus operandi of the foreign Hells Angels members, as might be required
by the foreign members. A membership is additionally considered to constitute a formal
cooperation between the domestic members with individuals, many of which are hardened,
heavily organized and dangerous criminals. Reference is made to members of the Hells Angels
MC in Denmark having participated in violent conflicts with migrant gangs and motorcycle
gangs involved in organized crime.427 These conflicts are considered to be largely over
dominance of the narcotic market.
After receiving the risk assessment, the Directorate of Immigration decided on the same
day to deny Mr. Kristiansen entry into Iceland. Entry was denied on the basis of Act on
Foreigners, claiming necessity on grounds of public order and public safety, depending upon “if
the foreign national exhibits conduct, or may be considered likely to engage in conduct, that
involves a substantial and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental attitudes of society.”428
The directorate relies here on legitimate limitation to the right to free movement of person within
the EEA.429
The Reykjavík district court rules against Mr. Kristiansen who claimed the risk
assessment of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police to be misleading, incorrect and
426

Ibid.
Ibid.
428
Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 2. See on the legal provision:
Act on Foreigners no. 96/2002. Subsection c paragraph 1 of article 41 as referred to in the judgment; paragraph 1 of
article 42 as referred to in subparagraph c; as well as paragraph 2 of article 42 for clarification. Act on Foreigners no
96/2002, para. 2, article 42.
429
Lög um útlendinga (Act on Foreigners), no. 96 from 15 April 2002, art. 41 and 42. Decision of the EEA Joint
Committee No 158/2007 on free movement of persons [2007] OJ L124/20; Decision of the EEA Joint Committee
No 158/2007 on free movement of persons [2007] OJ L124/20, art 5 para 1 and art. 27, para 1 and 2.
427

91

lacking references for its sources. The court found the assessment to be sufficient, noting it to be
based on confidential information from police authorities of the Nordic countries, public
information, especially media coverage in the Nordic countries and reports from EUROPOL.430
The court finds there to be no need to disclose the sources for the assessment and notes that there
might be vested interests against publication of confidential information. The court found the
National commissioner of the Icelandic Police to have legal competence to create risk
assessments of this kind, finding the police to be the right authority to assess if circumstances
required that a foreigner be denied entry.431
Furthermore the court finds the Directorate Of Immigration and the ministry to have the
role to decide, based on that assessment, if legal requirements were sufficiently satisfied, but not
to review the assessment made by the police.432
The court also finds against Mr. Kristiansen’s complaint that his denial of entry to
Iceland had not sufficient basis in law. The court finds that the domestic legislation affords
authorities leeway for interpreting what constitutes public order and public security. Authorities
would however have to interpret these concepts in accordance with objective arguments and the
states obligations under the EEA treaty.433 The court finds the right of citizens to move and
reside freely within the European Union to have been provided for in Iceland by an amendment
to the Act on Foreigners in 2008, in accordance with Iceland’s obligations under the EEA
treaty.434
The court finds therefore that Mr. Kristiansen’s denial of entry is an exception from the
main rule of free movement of persons within the EEA.435 Finding such an exception has to be
interpreted strictly and therefore this freedom can only be limited based on public order, public
430
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safety and public health.436 It is noteworthy that the court refers to the legitimate aims for
restrictions as listed in the EC directive, but not the differently worded domestic legislation.437
The court notes how serious organized crime is considered to go against public interests
and the security of the citizens.438 The court notes the Hells Angels MC was assessed to be
involved in organized crime and that authorities have countered them as such both domestically
and abroad.439 The court concludes that in the light of the nature of the Hells Angels MC and
their involvement with criminal activity, their members have been assessed to be a threat to
public order and public safety, and are therefore denied entry on the borders.440
Furthermore, Mr. Kristiansen claimed he had not been assessed individually as a person,
based on his personal activity, as is required by the EC directive of free movement of persons
from 2004. According to which, the denial of entry of an EES citizen requires personal conduct
of the individual concerned to represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat.441 The
directive specifically notes that justifications based of general prevention are not sufficient.
An important distinction has to be made here between Mr. Wahl’s case and Mr.
Kristiansen’s case. Mr. Wahl claimed he arrived to Iceland as a tourist, for the purpose of
sightseeing in Reykjavík and Icelandic nature, as well as intending to visit his friends in the
Fáfnir association (later MC Iceland).442 While Mr. Kristiansen claimed he arrived to Iceland to
meet with an Icelandic lawyer about matters related to the Hells Angels MC and MC Iceland.
However, the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police found the arrival of both men to be
interrelated to MC Iceland’s entry process into the Hells Angels MC.443
The court finds the involvement of each man with the Hells Angels MC to entail their
participation in the association’s activity, and finds that with their membership and participation,

436

Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 10 and 11.
Lög um útlendinga (Act on Foreigners), no. 96 from 15 April 2002, subpara c, para 1 art 41 and para 1 art 42.
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, para 1 art 27
438
Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11.
439
Ibid.
440
Ibid.
441
Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11. Further on the directive
see: Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, article 27.
442
Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 1.
443
Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 1 - 2. Reykjavík district court
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 2
437

93

they have taken up the position of supporting the activities and aims of the association.444 Here
the court seems to be making a reference to the European Court of Justice decision in the Van
Duyn case.445 There, the court found that while ones involvement in an organization did not in
and of it self establish that a person is more or less likely to engage in some specific conduct, it
still was a factor that domestic authorities were entitled to take into account.
The court found that both visits would have been instrumental to facilitate the entry of
MC Iceland into the Hells Angels MC, increasing the association’s presence in Iceland and
increasing the risk of organized crime. Based on this assessment the court concluded the arrival
of both men to have generated a genuine and serious threat to public order and public security.446
The court does not give clear guidance as to what would be sufficient connection to the
Hells Angels MC or MC Iceland. Arguably, membership in the Hells Angels MC is sufficient
for denial of entry on the borders. This assumption is based on the court’s finding that
membership establishes participation in the association’s activities and consequently the
individual has taken the position of supporting the activities and aims of the association.447
Furthermore the court states: “In the light of the nature of the Hells Angels MC and their linkage
with criminal activity the members of the association have been assessed to be a threat to public
order and public security and hence have been denied entry on the borders.”448 The threat they
are found to pose is based on the risk of them facilitating the increased presence of the Hells
Angels MC and thereby increased risk of organized crime. No reference is made to the two
men’s own reputation or criminal record.
The Court rejects the interpretation maintained by the plaintiffs that denial of entry on the
basis of public order and public security is not permitted unless the same measures could be
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taken against an Icelandic citizen.449 The Court notes that authorities can take various different
measures against Icelandic citizens on grounds of threat to public peace and public order while
as the Icelandic constitution bars deportation or denial of entry of Icelandic citizens.450
Therefore, the Court finds that denial of entry on the basis of public order and public security is
permitted under the Act on Foreigners although the same measure cannot be taken against an
Icelandic citizen. This is again in line with the Van Duyn judgment that found domestic
authorities entitled to put restrictions on foreign nationals even where the state did not put similar
restrictions on its own nationals.451
In the case of Van Duyn, the European Court of Justice notes the principle of freedom of
movement within the European Economic Community without any discrimination on grounds of
nationality, to be a fundamental principle.452 The court, however, notes that there are particular
circumstances that justify measures to be taken on the ground of public policy for limitation of
this freedom. The court also recognizes that the domestic public policy may vary between the
member states and between periods of time.453 The court therefore reserves an area of discretion
for the authorities of the member states within the limitations imposed by the Treaty.
Subsequently the European Court of Justice finds that “. . . the Member State cannot be required,
before it can rely on the concept of public policy, to make such activities unlawful, if recourse to
such a measure is not thought appropriate in the circumstances.”454 Finding this conclusion to
flow from its arguments “. . . where the competent authorities of a Member State have clearly
defined their standpoint as regards the activities of a particular organization and where,
considering it to be socially harmful, they have taken administrative measures to counteract these
activities, . . .”455 Finally, the court finds that a member state can, for reasons of public policy,
restrict freedom of movement based on individuals association with an organization even though
that state does not place similar restriction upon its own nationals with regards to the same
449
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organization.456 Where the state considers the activities of the organization to be socially
harmful even if the activities of the organization are not unlawful.
Icelandic authorities can therefore deny foreigners of entry on the borders if it is deemed
necessary for public order or public safety. On this basis, members of organizations found to be
involved in organized crime have been denied of entry on the borders, as they were considered to
increase the risk of organized crime and thereby being a genuine and serious threat to public
order and public security.

Administrative approach
Attempts to Close Club Houses
This study found Icelandic authorities to be using an administrative approach to counter
organized crime. A statement from the police shows that after the police raided the clubhouse of
Fáfnir, as part of a criminal investigation in 2007, they summoned different city and state
authorities to inspect the building.457 These authorities included the fire department, building
inspector, electricity inspector and health authorities. The study was unable to verify the
response of these authorities, but shortly thereafter the club moved out of the facilities they then
occupied in downtown Reykjavík (the capital of Iceland). Fáfnir has since become MC Iceland,
a prospect club of the Hells Angels MC, and later a full patched club of the Hells Angels MC.
Over a period of less than ten years the club has relocated at least three times, and been located
in three different municipals.458
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This seems to suggest that authorities in Iceland are using administrative powers in
efforts to close the clubhouses of associations considered to be involved with organized crime.
Denial of Trademark Registration
The Icelandic Patent office rejected in 2011 the application of the Hells Angels MC
Iceland to register their trademark, both logo and name.459 The rejection was based on legitimate
limitations for registration under article 14 of the Icelandic Trade Mark Act no. 45/1997.
Subparagraph 3 provided that: “if the mark is contrary to law or public order or likely to cause
offence”460.
The reason given for the denial was that the mark is intended to stand for activity that
was thought to be organized crime. The patent office stated that a recent judgement of the
district court of Reykjavík revealed that the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police
considered the motorcycle association Hells Angels to be involved in organized crime, operating
globally.461 This assessment was supported by the assessment of EUROPOL that the Hells
Angels MC falls within its definition of organized crime.
The patent office notes in it’s reasoning that organized crime is a social threat directed at
public interests and public safety.462 The Icelandic Patent Office has emphasized that the
travaux préparatoires for the Trade Mark Act explains that the used of a mark, if not the mark
itself, can be a reason for denial of registration. Consequently, the Patent office finds the law not
to allow the registration of a Hells Angels MC Iceland’s trademark, as the activity the mark
would stand for is thought to be organized crime.463
459
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The attorney for the Hells Angels has twice requested for the decision to be reversed.
The attorney argues that Hells Angels MC Iceland is not involved in organized crime and that
evidence to the contrary is ill supported and in fact only based on police investigative
evidence.464 The attorney also argues that the association has a right to register its name and
logo, just as its members have a constitutional right to associate in the association.465
The Icelandic Patent Office has at the time of writing still not given its answer to the
Hells Angels MC Iceland’s attorney’s second request.466

Summary of Non-Criminal Justice Responses found to be used in Iceland
Authorities in Iceland are denying members in associations found to be involved in
organized crime from entering the country, as an effort to prevent organized crime activity. The
denial is based on genuine and serious threat to public order and public security.
Authorities even restrict in this way the right to freedom of movement that citizens of the
Schengen states enjoy within the Schengen area, based on these members being a genuine and
serious threat to public order and public security. The assessment of the associations lies with
the National Commissioner of the Police as the competent authority.
Authorities in Iceland can also be seen to be using Administrative measure to counter
organized crime by taking evidence of organized criminality into consideration when making
administrative decisions. This can be seen from the denial of registration of the name and
insignia of the Hells Angels MC by the Icelandic Patent office, as well as from the use of
municipal powers in efforts to prevent the use of properties for activities of associations
considered to be involved in organized crime.

464

Icelandic Patent Office, ‘Vörumerkjaumsókn nr. 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (orð- og
myndmerki)’ (Trademark application no. 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (word and logo)) (Icelandic
Patent Office, August 22, 2012) ‘Icelandic Patent Office, ‘Vörumerkjaumsókn nr. 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS
MC ICELAND, (orð- og myndmerki)’ (Trademark application no 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND,
(word and logo)) (Icelandic Patent Office, October 30, 2012)
465
Icelandic Patent Office, ‘Vörumerkjaumsókn nr. 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (orð- og
myndmerki)’ (Trademark application no 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (word and logo)) (Icelandic
Patent Office, August 22, 2012), p 2 – 3.
466
As of June 2013

98

The use of non-criminal justice responses to counter criminal behaviour in general and
organized crime in particular should be relevant to discussions in the field of Transnational
Criminal Law. Indubitably, this should be relevant to the discussion if criminal law is suitable to
counter collective behaviour such as organized crime. Also, the above described use of noncriminal justice responses to counter organized crime should make Boister’s statement
questionable that Transnational Criminal Law is a doctrinal match to Transnational Crime, based
on how Boister excludes non-criminal justice responses from the field of Transnational Criminal
Law.
Finally, the above coverage must raise the question whether transnational efforts to
counter organized crime are promoting non-criminal justice responses to counter organize crime,
and if not, should they be promoting them in the light of the criticism that the criminal justice
responses meet? This will be researched in the next subchapter.
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Transnational promotion of non-criminal justice responses
The study has at this point confirmed the utilization of non-criminal justice responses by
domestic authorities for the purpose of countering organized crime, beyond the approaches that
focus at the proceeds of crime and crime related assets. The second phase of this research
examined if such non-criminal justice responses are being promoted at the international level.
To investigate if non-criminal justice responses are being promoted, the study continued by
reviewing official documents from the European Union and the United Nations that have to do
with cooperation in criminal matters. The documents were reviewed in search for evidence of
promotion of non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime, utilizing the
understanding gained by the first phase of the research of what kind of non-criminal justice
responses were used for this purposes by domestic authorities.
The search revealed no evidence of the United Nations promoting such non-criminal
justice responses.
The European Union was found to be promoting a variety of non-criminal justice
responses that have a different focus than the criminal asset approaches. The European Union is
influencing the approach taken by its member states for countering organized crime, by
promoting non-criminal justice responses. Additionally, not only is the European Union
facilitating the sharing of information between its member states, but is in fact an important part
of developing the non-criminal justice responses that are being promoted seems to take place at
the transnational or even the supranational level within the Union.
Evidence for promotion of non-criminal justice responses by the European Union in it’s
policy was found as early as 1997. That year the Council of the European Communities
promoted the utilization of preventive approach to counter organized crime, claiming prevention
to be “. . . no less important than repression in any integrated approach to organized crime, to the
extent that it aims at reducing the circumstances in which organized crime can operate.”467
467
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This was followed up by Council Resolution, ‘on the prevention of organised crime with
reference to the establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it’ in 1998.468 In the
resolution the Commission and Europol are given the task of making a proposal on how
preventive measures could be promoted in future work at the European level and in particular in
its legal instruments. More specifically these supranational bodies are invited to assess the most
effective preventative measures, by which bodies and at what level, including to which extent
these measures could be taken at the European Union level.
In ‘A European Union Strategy for the beginning of the new millennium’ from the year
2000 the European Union promotes a preventive and multidisciplinary approach to counter
organized crime.469 Ten years later in 2010, the roadmap for the European Union in the area of
justice, freedom and security, the Stockholm Programme, promotes the use of an administrative
approach to prevent and counter organized crime.470 Furthermore, in its conclusion on setting
the EU’s priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013, the Council
appeals to its member states “. . . to actively use, in addition to the traditional criminal justicebased approach, alternative and complementary approaches and instruments to fight serious and
organised crime”.471 Finally, the Council adopted the same wording in ‘Council conclusions on
setting the EU’s priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime between 2014 and
2017’, appealing again to its member states to actively use alternative and complementary
approaches and instruments to fight serious and organised crime.472
Furthermore, the Council of the European Union in 2012 sent the Standing Committee on
operational co-operation on internal security (COSI) “. . . a number of proposals and suggestions
to take forward the multidisciplinary and administrative approach to combat organised crime”473.
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Showing a political body of the Union to be directing a bureaucratic ‘expert’ body of the Union
towards an emphasize on non-criminal justice responses.
A survey conducted by the Netherlands delegation to the European Union shows that the
member states of the Union suggest and welcome facilitation, cooperation and guidance at the
level of the European Union for countering organized crime by way of a Non-Criminal Justice
approach.474 Furthermore, the supranational bodies of the Union, such as Europol and Eurojust,
are seen by the member states as suitable for playing a role in transnational cooperation for NonCriminal Justice Response to organized crime.475
The survey reveals that the member states see the European Union to have an important
role to play in sharing of information about and developing non-criminal justice responses to
counter organized crime. The survey finds the member states to call for the union to contribute
in three ways.476 First, the member states request that the future policy of the Union facilitates
international cooperation on “an integrated, non-penal administrative approach”477. Second, to
facilitate the sharing of information about existing practices and experience. Finally, to provide
a platform at the Union level where the member states can address “. . . proposals and initiatives
with regard to the administrative approach to organised crime.”478
The above coverage shows how the European Union is promoting non-criminal justice
responses in its policy.
The European Union has also taken active part in the selection and development of noncriminal justice responses to be implemented at the domestic level.
As early as in 2011 the European Union made a handbook describing good practices in
administrative approach to countering organized crime. The Handbook is entitled:
474
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“Complementary approaches and actions to prevent and combat organised crime – A collection
of good practice examples from EU Member States”, frequently referred to as “The Hungarian
Handbook”.479 The Hungarian handbook is not a one-time compilation, the handbook is
continuously upgraded and maintained by experts within domestic law enforcement agencies and
Europol.480
Additionally, the European Union has provided two platforms where the Union and the
member states can address existing and new non-criminal justice responses to counter organized
crime.
An informal network group has been established under the Presidency of the Union,
made up of one representative from each member state.481 The network group’s mandate
according to publicly available information is to promote administrative measures as an
approach, as well as to share information about its use amongst the member states and encourage
sharing of best practices.482 The network is also intended to propose new initiatives in
developing administrative measures and make suggestions to highest authorities in the European
Union. The network will provide information and give advise to the Council of the Union on
policy and the Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) on operational oriented
proposals.483 The Europol Platform for Experts, under Europol, is intended to support the
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informal network group.484 The platform for experts and the informal network seem to be
intended to exchange information on each network’s knowledge and suggestions.
The Europol Platform for Experts is intended to facilitate compilation of national
legislations; examples of best practice in administrative approaches; and provide questions and
answers for practical difficulties.485 As well as facilitating focus groups on specific criminal
activity; collaboration in the preparation of documents; and facilitating a contact point between
those tasked with the administrative approaches in different countries. The Europol Platform for
Experts is, by invitation only, secure virtual community of experts on law enforcement. The
virtual platform offers variety of forums, some are made up of law enforcement officials only,
but others also have members that are not law enforcement officials, such as experts from the
private sector and the academia. The Europol Platform for Experts has a forum named
“Administrative approaches to tackling organised crime”.486 It is, however, unclear what forums
are for law enforcement officials only and which are open to external experts. It is however
unclear if that forum or any of the others is closed to law enforcement officials, or open for
external experts. Additionally, the variety of expertise having been gathered by the forum is
unclear. Europol seems therefore to be reaching out for expert knowledge. However, it remains
indeterminate to what extent this knowledge influences or guides the discussion and knowledge
generation within Europol.
Additionally, the research conducted shows how the supranational bodies of the
European Union actively engaged in the implementation of both criminal and non-criminal
justice responses at the domestic level.487
Two cases, where known Hells Angels MC members were denied access on the borders,
show that Icelandic authorities relied on Europol’s criteria for assessing as to whether or not the
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Hells Angels MC were involved in organized crime.488 The use of Europol’s definition is
interesting, as the Icelandic Parliament had two years earlier for the first time defined criminal
organization as part of its enactment that criminalized participation in organized crime.489 Yet,
the case makes no reference to this definition in the Criminal Code.
A reference to Europol’s assessment of Hells Angels MC being a criminal organization is
again made in a criminal case in Iceland from 2012, where a report from Europol was submitted
titled: “Knowledge Report: The Hells Angels MC: A Criminal Organisation”490. In the
testimony of an Icelandic police officer in the case Europol is said to have reached the
conclusion that the Hells Angels MC were a criminal organization based on the criteria set by the
European Union. The report is not accessible to the public and Europol denied the request for
access for the purpose of this study.491
The report referred to in the 2012 criminal case is from February 2012 so it might not be
the same report as referred to in the 2011 case. Still, both these cases show an example of
supranational institution of the European Union, in this case Europol, to be directly involved in
the implementation of a domestic responses by offering information, definition, methodology
and assessment.
This study therefore claims, based on the above coverage, that an emerging or established
transnational system of non-criminal justice responses is to be found within the European Union
- one fully comparable to the system of Transnational Criminal Law in terms of its influence on
domestic morality and substantive norms.
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Compatibility of Promotion of Non-Criminal Justice
Responses under International Law with Fundamental
Principles of Law and Good Governance.
This study intends next to examine if the promotion of non-criminal justice responses
under International Law raises less concerns for incompatibility with fundamental principles of
law and good governance than the system of Transnational Criminal Law currently does.
The study has already established that domestic authorities are utilizing a wide variety of
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime. Additionally, some examples have
been found of what kind of non-criminal justice responses domestic authorities are utilizing for
counter organized crime, looking at outlaw motorcycle gangs as an example. Furthermore, the
literature review chapter detailed some of the concerns and criticisms that have been raised with
the utilization of non-criminal justice responses to counter criminal activity.
Finally, the study has shown how the European Union is promoting non-criminal justice
responses as a complementary approach and specific responses as best practice amongst its
member states. This promotion of the European Union is found to represent the promotion of
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime under International Law.
Consequently, the study shows International Law to be indirectly suppressing organized crime
through domestic legislations outside the sphere of domestic criminal law.
The promotion of the European Union of non-criminal justice responses is therefore
considered suitable for examining if the promotion of non-criminal justice responses under
International Law raises less concerns for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and
good governance than the system of Transnational Criminal Law currently does.
The promotion of the European Union of non-criminal justice responses was tested
against criteria of five issues that can be identified as important concerns previously raised with
the globalization of crime control, notably by Boister and Parkin.492 The five issues examined
are: Justification for transnational response; legitimacy for the promotion; doctrinal weaknesses;
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emphasize on compatibility with Human Rights and other fundamental principles of law;493 and
finally, the knowledge base of the transnationalization494.
At the offset it should be acknowledged that the restricted access to information about
promotion of non-criminal justice responses by the European Union and the process for selection
and development of non-criminal justice responses proved to be problematic for the examination.

Justification for transnational response
The first part of the criteria examines if the transnationalization of non-criminal justice
responses is a justifiable approach to the perceived social problem. The issue of lack of
justification has been raised with the transnational criminalization under the system of
Transnational Criminal Law.495
The promotion of non-criminal justice responses within the European Union is largely
part of the same policy as promotes the system of Transnational Criminal Law within the Union
and relies largely on the same justification.496 The issue in this context is the appropriateness of
transnational efforts, as opposed to solely domestic efforts for countering organized crime. The
promotion of non-criminal justice responses under international law is seen to need a specific
justification, justifying why the selection of approaches and responses of domestic authorities to
domestic social problems should be governed at the international level.
Boister warned against using the system of Transnational Criminal Law to form
transnational morality. He claims the system to lack holistic policy based on sound knowledge
of the social construction of the transnational threats and the appropriateness of transnational
penal response to these threats, based on scientific knowledge free from rhetoric.497 Boister
claims the assessment of the appropriateness of transnational promotion of the penal approach to
require discussion of coherent principles about individual autonomy, welfare, harm and
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minimalism, justifying or constraining the criminalization. He claims the establishment of the
system of Transnational Criminal Law to fail in discussing these coherent principles.
Additionally, Boister claims transnational criminalization to rest upon, “. . . assumptions about
the legitimate political, social and economic interests of states, and assertions about the harm
caused to these interests by the conduct criminalized”498, while claiming the question to be
largely absent, as to whether there would be any direct harm to individuals.
The European Union’s involvement in countering organized crime is mainly justified by
the rational that organized crime is on the rise within the union and is increasingly costly to the
society.499 Also, that crime are increasingly being organized and committed across borders,
while law enforcement authorities remain for the most part restricted to operating within the
borders of nation states, making transnational response necessary.500
Unfortunately however, the claim for organized crime being on the rise is mainly
established with reference to assessments made by Europol, assessments that have and continues
to be criticized, by the academic community, inter alia for being methodologically flawed and
for lacking definition of core terms such as organized crime, risk, etc.501 Scholarly writings have
emphasized the need for a scientifically sound risk assessment to decide, and clearly state, the
risk being assessed, in terms of what harm is being posed by what threat.502 For such an
assessment it would have to be decided, for example, whether to assess either the risk of violence
498
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or of monetary loss. Such decisions having to be made in order to avoid other normative
decisions such as whether violence or corruption creates more risk.503 The same scholarly
discussion has shown that risk assessment for organized crime suffers from imperfect
information about organized crime, caused inter alia by the lack of consensus for definition - or
even common understanding - of what constitutes organized crime.504 That is not to deny the
existence or extent of the threat but to point out the important fact that currently ‘knowledge’ of
the perceived threat has a poor evidential basis, affecting the justification for a transnational
response and selection of approaches and responses.
The European Parliament reflected upon the justification for specific efforts to counter
organized crime in its Resolution on organised crime in the European Union in 2011, stating that:
“. . . organised crime has a substantial social cost, in that it violates human
rights, undermines democratic principles, diverts and wastes financial,
human and other resources, distorting the free internal market, contaminating
businesses and legitimate economic activities, encouraging corruption and
polluting and destroying the environment;”505
The European Union has ranked organized crime to be among the biggest threats to
internal security of the union and its citizens, frequently placing organized and serious crime side
by side with terrorism in this context.506 The Union has stated that this threat will only be
adequately dealt with by a joint effort of its member states and the union itself. “This calls for a
dynamic and coordinated response by all member states, a response that not only takes into
account national strategies but also seeks to become an integrated and multidisciplinary
European strategy.”507
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It is therefore unsettling in this context, that at a meeting of the Civil Liberties, Justice
and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament - with Rob Wainwright, Director of
Europol, and Martin Power, Chair, Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal
Security - committee members saw reasons to discuss “. . . the need to develop better the
definitions in relation to organised crime, . . .”508 Further, the Commission of the European
Communities has recognized in its communication to the Council and the European Parliament
how the difficulties in defining ‘criminal organisation’ have a bad impact on efforts for
countering organized crime.509 This apparent difficulty in defining organized crime is not
surprising in the light of Calderoni’s finding that “. . . a common understanding of the concept of
criminal organization is lacking . . .”510 amongst the member states of the European Union.
From early on the European Union has promoted the use of non-criminal justice
responses based on the experience of its member states.511 Reference has been made to how
member states have had good experience with utilization of non-criminal justice responses, but
no empirical evidence have been cited for this, nor has it been explained how the assessment was
conducted.512 Scholars have, however, claimed that political interests and particular incidents,
more than scientific research, have driven domestic organized crime legislations.513
Additionally, research has found the policymaking of the European Union in the field of criminal
matters to be based on less than sound knowledge.514
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Still, the European Union has seen it as its role to facilitate information sharing of
existing responses and experience, on the union level, encouraging member states to introduce
responses in line with a selection of existing practices of its member states.515 Furthermore, the
Union has considered its supranational institutions best fit to collect existing experience in this
field, and assess what practices should be promoted as best practice.516
The social problem perceived to be organized crime requiring specific legal remedies has
not been shown to be the same or similar social problems between the member states. Lack of
consensus about what are the constitutive characteristics suggest also a lack of consensus about
what are the characteristics of organized crime that justify specific legal remedies.517 It seems
questionable to introduce harmonized regional response to an unknown variety of marginally
different social problems.
The same reasoning raises important doubt about the promotion of a particular domestic
responses in one member state as best practice, suggesting that other member states should
model their responses on this best practice.518 The social problem perceived to be organized
crime might be different between the member states. Additionally, the response is not
guaranteed to have the same legal and social impact in different social, cultural, historical,
economic and legal context.519
The above reasoning brings about Boister’s concern for forming transnational morality
by way of using the system of Transnational Criminal Law.520 The union is ‘appealing’ to its
member states, as part of the policy for joint efforts of the member states, to adopt non-criminal
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justice responses to behaviour that the union is describing in its definition of organized crime.521
Consequently, the Union can be argued to be creating transnational morality. However the
following subchapter about legitimacy suggests that the Union lacks democratic legitimacy to do
so.
Finally, a major justification for the involvement of the European Union in the promotion
of non-criminal justice responses and development of responses is its Union wide knowledge and
unique ability to create further such knowledge. However, the following subchapter about the
knowledge base of the promotion of non-criminal justice responses raises important concerns
about the soundness of the knowledge generated by the Union within the field.522
The appropriateness of the European Union’s involvement in the promotion of noncriminal justice response to organized crime seems therefore to have questionable justifications.
This is not to say that the transnational efforts to counter organized crime can not be justified.
Rather the above examination portrays how the appropriateness of the transnational efforts has
been poorly justified and how the current initiative needs to be amended in order to become
justifiable.

Legitimacy
The second part of the criteria is to examine the legitimacy for the transnationalization of
non-criminal justice responses. This requires to examine the legitimate authorization behind the
actions taken for the transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses.
Legal authorization within the European Union and its member states is governed by
democratic form of governance.523 The treaty on the European Union states that the Union is “. .
. founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of
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law and respect for human rights, . . .”524 For the present purposes it is not necessary to provide
a comprehensive review of the political and ideological literature that the discussion about
democracy has generated, as the term ‘democracy’ is contested as well as the notion of what
constitutes this form of governance. A more general account is deemed sufficient.
Democracy is generally perceived to be a form of governance where state power is vested
in the ‘demos’ (the general public), where the demos are involved in decision making of the
state, generally through some system of voting.525 Democracy is generally perceived of as being
participatory, consultative, transparent and publicly accountable, resting in one way or another
on the consent of the governed.526 Rule of Law is generally considered to be an inherent part of
democracy.527 The ‘Rule of Law’ is associated with the notion that authorities just as well as the
people should be governed by law and limited in their action by the same law.528 The law being
laid down beforehand, make it possible for the individual to plan their affairs in accordance with
knowledge of what is allowed in the society and the foreseeable actions of authorities.529
The treaty on the European Union describes the decision makers of the Union to be
democratically accountable either directly to the citizens of the Union at the Union level, or in
case of representatives of the member states in the European Council to the citizens of the
relevant nation state or to the national Parliament.530
Transparency is ensured under Article 10 that requires the Union to make decisions to be
taken as openly and as closely to the citizen as possible, ensuring the citizen’s right to
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democratic participation.531 Without transparency, the citizens would not be able to participate
in the democratic governance of the Union, as they would not be able to make informed
decisions when choosing representatives or keeping representatives democratically accountable.
‘Rule of law’ is described to be one of the founding values of the European Union.”532
‘Rule of Law’ is recognized as a fundamental principle by both the European Court of Justice,
the Union’s own court, and the European Court of Human Rights, which the union adheres to.533
The European Union competence to act is further limited by the principles of conferral,
subsidiarity and proportionality.
The principle of conferral limits the Union to acting only within the limits of the
competence granted to it by the member states, and only to obtain the objectives set out by the
member states. The principle of subsidiarity requires the Union should only act, in areas where
the Union does not have exclusive competence, where “. . . the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and
local level, . . .”534 The principle of proportionality dictates that the Union shall not act beyond
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.535
The member states have granted the European Union competence to act to prevent and
combat crime, with the objective of providing its citizens “freedom, security and justice”.536 For
this purposes, the member states have granted the Union competence to arrange for cooperation
and coordination between police, judicial authorities and other competent authorities.537
It can, however, be argued to be questionable if the assessment and promotion of specific
responses by the Union fits within the limitations of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality.
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With regards to the Union’s principle of subsidiarity, domestic authorities can be argued
to be sufficiently and even more sufficiently capable of developing and assessing approaches and
specific responses best fit for countering their domestic organized crime problem, in their
respective legal system and society. This can primarily be argued on the basis of the above
detailed arguments that there is no consensus amongst the Member States of the Union about
what constitutes organized crime and based on the difference between organized crime
legislations in the member states.538
Furthermore, the previously detailed discussions from the field of pluralism and
comparative law, suggest that real harmonization is hard to achieve especially if evaluated from
a functionalistic perspective.539 Additionally, these discussions show that each legal system is
unique to its society and each society is unique to the legal system that governs it.540 The
assessment of best practice and experience by the European Union is therefore bound to either
disseminate the Unions own perception of the social problem intended to counter, or that of one
or more of the member states. In so doing, the Union or influential member states might unduly
influence other member states.541 Consequently, centralized development and assessment of
responses to varieties of marginally different social problems, for multiple marginally different
societies and legal systems, seems not to be a viable approach, nor seems it to be compatible
with the European Union’s principle of subsidiarity.
The principle of proportionality, requires the Union not to act beyond what is necessary
to achieve the objectives sought. The Union’s involvement in selection and development of
approaches and responses is arguably disproportionate to the objective of promoting the use of
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime, if information sharing would be
sufficient to achieve the objective.
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The European Union action, to select specific responses and appeal to its member states
to adopt the selected responses, seems therefore questionable in the light of its principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.
When examining democratic legitimacy for the promotion on non-criminal justice
responses, it is important to note that the European Union has for a long time been criticized for
democratic deficiency.542 The democratic deficiency is said to be caused by variety of factors.
The Union is criticized for contributing to increased powers of the Executive at the cost
of the national parliaments of the member states, as the national governments are represented by
both the Council and the Commission and acting on that level, they are not much accountable to
their national parliaments.543 Additionally, the Union is seen to adopt policies that are not
supported by a majority in many, or even most member states.544 Finally, the citizens of the
European Union are said not to understand the Union, and are therefore unable to take part in it
as a democratic system.545
This criticism is particularly relevant for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
where the parliament of the European Union has limited competence and the national
parliaments can be argued to have little influence.546 Additionally, the European Parliament had
no formal jurisdiction in criminal matters, until the field came to a limited extent under the
supranational power of the European Parliament in 2009.547 Furthermore, part of the criticism on
the European Union’s ‘democratic deficiency’ claims the European Parliament too weak to
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balance the executive power within the Union, and suffers it self from ‘democratic
deficiency’.548
Sheptycki claims that “. . . the assumption in a democratic society is that the elected
control penal policy”549. This might not be accurate when it comes to policies and norms created
by the European Union in the field of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Consequently,
the above coverage raises concerns if the promotion of non-criminal justice responses as an
approach to counter organized crime, as well as specific responses as best practices, lacks
democratic legitimacy.
The involvement and influence of bureaucratic institutions and law enforcement
authorities in creation of soft law and recommendations of the European Union raises concerns
over legitimacy do to incompatibility with the Rule of Law and in particular the ‘separation of
powers doctrine’550. Law enforcement officials and bureaucrats, domestically and at the
international level, are seen to be instrumental in the creation of the different guidelines and
recommendations created by the European Union on how to increasingly utilize non-criminal
justice responses to counter organized crime.551 The creation of these guidelines and
recommendations seems not to be sufficiently guided by the legislative or reviewed by the
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judiciary.552 Consequently, bureaucratic institutions of the executive, at the national and
subnational level, are effectively influencing the legislative development under the authority of
the European Union and obligations of member states of the Union under different international
legal instruments in the field of crime control.553
Additional concerns must be raised over compatibility with the principle of ’legal
certainty’554, also embedded in the Rule of Law. The principle requires the rules of the society to
be fixed and announced beforehand, making the authorities use of its coercive power in given
circumstances foreseeable with adequate certainty, permitting those subject to the rules to plan
their affairs so as not to become subject to the states coercive power.555 Concerns for lack of
legal certainty are caused by the secrecy of the European Union’s evaluation and selection of best
practices, from existing practices of the member states.556 Particularly, as this study has shown
domestic authorities to utilize existing legislations, not intended for countering organized crime,
in a creative manner with low requirement of involvement and fault for the organized criminality
– consequently this use of coercive state power may be argued not to be adequately foreseeable
in some circumstances. Furthermore, the argument for the need for secrecy in the name of public
security, arguing that individuals involved in organized crime could misuse the compilations
made by the European Union to identify weaknesses in the system and avoid efforts of the
authorise if they were publicly available, seems incompatible with the principle of Rule of
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Law.557 The concerns for incompatibility with the Rule of Law will be discussed in further
details under a separate subchapter on fundamental principles of law below.
The final democratic criteria to be examined here is that of transparency. Transparency is
ensured under Article 10 that requires the Union to make decisions as openly and as close as
possible to the citizen, ensuring the citizen’s right to democratic participation.558 Without
transparency, the citizen would not be able to participate in the democratic governance of the
Union, as he would not be able to make informed decisions when choosing representatives or
keeping representatives democratically accountable. Transparency has been argued to be crucial
for democratic decision making, in particular within the EU.559
As detailed above, the research into the promotion of non-criminal justice responses by
the European Union shows transparency to be lacking in the promotion of non-criminal justice
responses. Information about the responses being promoted is not publicly available, for reasons
of public security, and the approach is ill defined in publicly available documents.560
Additionally, the process and criteria for selecting responses to be promoted is not publicly
available. Furthermore, the problem intended to counter is ill defined and consensus is lacking
amongst the member states of what are the constitutive characteristics of the social problem that
has been called organized crime.561 Finally, the justification for the necessity of the response is
primarily based on threat assessments, which again are largely based on restricted information.562
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The European Union is therefor promoting non-criminal justice responses as an approach
to counter organized crime, without informing the public about what constitutes such an
approach. Neither, what responses are being promoted, nor what constitutes the behaviour that
will initiate the utilization of these responses. This lack of transparency effectively prevents
democratic accountability.
The examination of the transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses within the
European Union raises concerns for lack of legitimacy. The concerns have to do with the
decision making at the European Union level, as well as absence of efforts by the Union to
secure or promote legitimate authorization at the domestic level. In fact, the initiative could be
argued to promote non-criminal justice responses through law enforcement agencies of the
member states in a way that by design boycotts both legislative authorities and public discussion.
This process seems to be in line with Nadelmann’s claim of international law being used to “. . .
develop a cosmopolitan international morality without the citizens of state parties having much
to do with their adoption or application.”563

Doctrinal Weaknesses
The third part of the criteria is if the transnationalization of non-criminal justice
responses raises concerns for doctrinal weaknesses. The examination focuses on doctrinal
weaknesses that have previously been claimed to haunt the system of Transnational Criminal
Law.564
The previously mentioned lack of consensus for what are the constitutive characteristics
of the subject matter of the initiative, organized crime, must be considered a major doctrinal
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weakness for any initiative for the development of approaches or responses to the said social
problem.
There is little to be found about the definition of organized crime in the publicly available
documents mapping the development of transnational non-criminal justice responses within the
European Union. However, what can be found suggest that those concerned consider the
definition in need of improvement. The Commission of the European Communities noted in its
communication to the Council and the European Parliament the challenge in tackling organized
crime caused by difficulties in defining “criminal organisation”.565 Similarly, at a meeting of the
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, committee
members saw reasons to discuss “. . . the need to develop better the definitions in relation to
organised crime, . . .”566 The survey presented to the EU by the delegation of the Netherlands
touches on this when discussing how to strengthen European cooperation, where France is
reported to stress: “. . . the need to first agree on the definition and scope of the non-penal
approach towards organised crime before taking steps towards joint European measures.”567
Judging from the academic discussion about Transnational Criminal Law, it seems that such
agreement would better have been reached before the steps were taken towards strengthening
European cooperation in that field. This problem is highlighted by academic discussions
showing lack of consensus about what constitutes organized crime and criticism of the
definitions that have been drafted at the international level.568 This has been covered in details in
the literature review.
Calderoni showed that within the European Union “. . . a common understanding of the
concept of criminal organization is lacking and that there are significant inconsistencies among
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national legal systems.”569 Additionally, he claims that the definition adopted by the European
Union as part of its Framework Decision of 2008 does not reflect best knowledge and scientific
research in this field and is in fact inferior in quality than the definitions adopted by some of its
member states.570
The longstanding difficulty with creating sufficient definition for organized crime makes
it difficult to select and develop responses that fit the social problem intended to counter, do to
lack of clarity as to what kind of behaviour these responses are intended to counter.
Additionally, the insufficient definition makes the scope of the responses adopted insufficiently
restricted to only the social problems intended to counter. Nevertheless, the transnationalization
of non-criminal justice responses is carried on based on the criticised definitions, without much
apparent efforts to improve the definition or make up for the flaws by further defining the subject
of individual initiatives, approaches or responses.
Widening scope of criminal liability is a concern that has been addressed in the context of
promotion of organized crime legislations by the system or Transnational Criminal Law,
particularly the element of conduct, culpability and level of involvement.571 Surely, by
definition, the non-criminal justice responses do not carry with them criminal liability, but they
do carry consequences that often are repressive to individuals. For example, Huisman and
Koemans, when discussing the administrative approach in the Netherlands, noted that:
“Measures are individualised and are based on information (suspicions) regarding previous
behaviour. The consequences of these administrative measures can also be more far-reaching
than those of criminal sanctions, while the safeguards of due process are considerably less so.”572
This study has shown non-criminal justice responses to be utilized to counter organized
crime in ways that bring far-reaching and repressive consequences for individual, raising
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important concerns for widening of legal liability.573 This research shows low requirements for
showing involvement, fault and causation for domestic authorities to be able to utilize noncriminal justice responses.574 Authorities were found to introduce remedies against individuals
without having established any element of criminal conduct or fault for the criminal conduct in
question. Some remedies seem to have been introduced mainly based on the individual’s
involvement with an association considered to be involved in organized crime. Such
involvement may not be limited to formal membership or proven participation, but can be based
on much lesser involvement where no act of participation is required. An example would be
previously detailed case of Mr. Stable’s.575 Also, and most importantly, there seems to be no
requirement to show an individual to be at fault for the criminal activity attributed to the criminal
organization in question. In fact it seems to be possible to introduce non-criminal justice
responses that are repressive on individuals, based on assessment of the threat posed by
organizations of which the individual is involved with.576 Some of the cases that were found
may even raise concerns for establishing guilt by association.
Furthermore, the non-criminal justice responses that establish grounds for criminal
sanctions have attracted criticism for widening the scope of the criminal law, inter alia by:
bringing minor social problems within the scope of the criminal law, providing authorities a
remedy for sanctioning individuals where previously there are no grounds for criminal sanctions,
for circumventing procedural safeguards, for providing repressive measures against individuals
without the involvement of the judiciary, and for incompatibility with Human Rights
requirements for standard of proof and individual’s right to fair trial.577 An example would be
573
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where non-criminal justice responses are introduced that place conditions on individuals, the
breach of which attracts criminal liability, such as the control orders under ‘the bikei law’ in
Australia.578
The European Union seems to have failed to address the lack of a doctrinal basis for this
apparent widening scope of liability caused by utilization of non-criminal justice responses to
organized crime, before promoting the approach.
Deciding up on the appropriate procedural rules and safeguards for non-criminal justice
responses is yet another doctrinal issue that has been raised with non-criminal justice responses
before courts in different jurisdictions and has been the subject of an extensive academic
discussion.579 Concerns have been raised over the exception of non-criminal justice responses
that are repressive on individuals and seem to be punitive in nature, from procedural safeguards
and Human Rights attributed to criminal proceedings, in the absence of sound doctrinal basis for
such exception. The main concerns have been covered in the literature review and will be
discussed in details in the subchapter on compatibility with Human Rights and fundamental
principles of Law. Addressing the concerns for the appropriate procedural rules seems of a
particular importance, as the utilization of these responses to criminal activity has been argued to
origin from efforts to bypass procedural safeguards that limited criminal justice responses.580
Furthermore, as discussed in detail in the literature review, scholarly work on pluralism
in global governance and on comparative legal studies suggest there to be important theoretical
578
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and practical difficulties with the creation of universal norms and comparison of legislations
between jurisdictions.581 Furthermore, the existing literature on legal comparison suggests that
transnational legal comparison requires “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist
comparisons”582 in its appropriate context. Such transnational legal comparison has been
suggested to require the appropriate legal-, historical-, economic-, political-, social- and
ideological-context both locally and internationally.583 Such comparison would require
interdisciplinary study of the relevant legal and non-legal norms, routines and social practices.584
Current attempts of the European Union to select and promoter best practices based on existing
practices and experience of member states, seems to contradict this pluralist legal thinking. As
the selection seems to failing to acknowledge how difference between the member states, such as
social and legal difference, might affect the implementation and effects of the responses effectively making it hard to select single set of best practices for all the member states.
The existing literature on domestic non-criminal justice responses shows the responses to
have raised important and relevant concerns for doctrinal weaknesses of these responses at the
domestic level.585 Study of the publicly available document in this subject area does not reveal
any evidence of the European Union having, in its promotion of non-criminal justice responses
to criminal behaviour, attempted to address the above mentioned doctrinal issue.
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Consequently, the European Union seems to be promoting domestic responses that are
haunted by doctrinal weaknesses, while the promotion it self seems equally haunted by doctrinal
weaknesses. The Unions seems to do so without either addressing the issues, or bringing those
issues to the attention of its member states, to ensure that they will be adequately addressed in
the evidence based decision making at the domestic level.

Human Rights and Fundamental Principles of Law
Emphasize on compatibility with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights in the
promotion of non-criminal justice responses by the European Union is the fourth part of the
criteria examined. Compatibility with Human Rights in the promotion of non-criminal justice
responses is of particular importance in the light of the value that has been given to Human
Rights in International Law in general and by the European Union in particular.586
The treaty on the European Union states that the Union is “. . . founded on the values of
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights, . . .”587 Additionally, member states of the European Union have recognized Human
Rights as being of a higher status and even made themselves subject to jurisdiction of an
international court to ensure this higher status of Human Rights to be respected.588 Furthermore,
the European Union is itself in the process of accessing the European Convention of Human
Rights, and subsequently becoming subject to its international court.589 These commitments
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should put compatibility with Human Rights into the forefront of all actions of the European
Union.
Still, the evidence show that in discussing the promotion of non-criminal justice
responses within the European Union, different bodies of the Union have seen reasons to
specifically emphasize that responses utilized to counter organized crime need to be compatible
with Human Rights and fundamental rights of the Union.590 Arguably suggesting that such
compatibility was lacking.
However, both the Council and the Commission have in the context of the promotion of
non-criminal justice responses raised the view that fundamental rights need to be balanced
against the interest of efficient law enforcement and prosecution. In 2005 the Commission
stated, in the context of developing strategy for countering organized crime: “In fighting this
scourge all actors must balance efficient law enforcement and prosecution of OC, and the
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.”591 A similar statement by the Council, in its
2000 millennium strategy, states that development of legal means to provide investigative
methods with respect to organized crime “. . . requires finding the proper balance between
effectiveness and the protection of fundamental human rights.”592 The view expressed here is
problematic as fundamental rights are generally considered fundamental set of rules, limited only
by the legitimate restrictions allowed for and described in the relevant texts and judicial
precedence. The main international Human Rights conventions do not allow for limitation in the
interest of effective law enforcement and prosecution.593 Nor are such restrictions known to
exist as legitimate limitations on fundamental Human Rights.
As covered in the literature review, various non-criminal justice responses in different
jurisdictions have been criticized for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and
Human Rights.
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Non-criminal justice responses have been criticized for failing to provide procedural
safeguards compatible with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights. The main
argument is that the non-criminal justice responses are de facto criminal in nature.594 This de
facto criminal nature is argued to be caused by characteristics such as the proceedings being
intended to counter criminal problems, being based on previous behaviour, even criminal
behaviour. Furthermore, the criminal nature of the responses has been argued based on the
ability of the non-criminal justice responses to bring about remedies, which although not
criminal punishments, are repressive on individuals and can in fact be more far reaching than
criminal sanctions.595 Additionally, the ability of the non-criminal justice responses to place
conditions on individuals that will bring criminal sanctions if breached has been argued to show
its nature as criminal sanctions.596
Based on their de facto criminal nature and their ability to provide grounds for criminal
sanctions, non-criminal justice responses have been argued to require the full range of the
procedural safeguards of the criminal law to be applied.597 Failure to secure procedural rights up
to the level of the criminal law standards has been argued to be a breach of the right to fair trial
under article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.598 Additionally, concerns have been raised with some of
those non-criminal justice responses being incompatible with the right to freedom of
association.599
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The European Court of Human Rights has decided that although the requirements
guarantied by the concept ‘fair trial’ may differ between trials that evolve around criminal
charges and those determining civil rights and obligations, the rights restricted to criminal
charges under paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 6 may also be applicable in cases determining civil
rights and obligations.600 The Court has claimed the authority to examine if sanctions are to be
considered ‘criminal’ for the purpose of the convention. Subsequently, the court has decided that
disciplinary or regulatory sanctions can be subject to the rights guarantied to those facing
criminal charges under the article.601 In its criteria, the Court looks at the classification of the
domestic legislation, the nature of the offence, and finally, the nature and degree of severity of
the sanction at risk for the individual. The court has decided that “. . . the general character of
the rule and the purpose of the penalty, being both deterrent and punitive, . . .”602 is decisive for
evaluating if the offence in question is criminal in nature, for the purpose of Article 6 of the
Convention.603 The Hungarian handbook is cited to explain the concept of administrative
approach, stating for example that “The administrative approach has both a penal and preventive
aspect.”604 The European Court of Human Rights might therefore see it fit to examine if noncriminal justice responses should be considered ‘criminal’, not only for the purpose of article 6,
but all rights and freedoms under the convention.605
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However, the European Court of Human Rights has decided against applicability of
rights specific for criminal cases under the right to fair trial, in cases that had to do with civil
forfeiture.606 The Court stated, in it's leading case, that it was decisive for the non criminal
nature of civil forfeiture that these preventive measures were neither designed to punish a
specific offence, nor do these measures imply a finding of a guilt for a specific offence.607 The
decision suggests that preventive non-criminal justice responses that do not rely on a finding of
guilt for a specific offence should not be considered criminal in nature.
The main issues that have been raised with the various non-criminal justice responses for
incompatibility with the right to fair trial, have primarily to do with the evidential rules of these
responses. It has been argued that the required standard of proof needs to be the ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’ standard of the criminal law, as opposed to the ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ of the civil law.608
Additionally, the ability of authorities to rally on ‘criminal intelligence’, that may not be
disclosed to the defence in obtaining court orders as under the ‘bikie law’ in Australia, has been
argued to violate the right to fair trial, specifically paragraph 3 of article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.609 However, rights under paragraph 3 are granted
exclusively to those facing criminal charges.
Furthermore, concerns have been raised with allowing the use of hearsay evidence, for
example for obtaining Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the United Kingdom.610 Again however,
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the right to fair trial generally only caries with it the right for a person to examine witnesses
relied on in a case against him, when that person is accused of a crime.611
Finally, the ‘bikie law’ in Australia allows for control orders that ban individuals from
communicating with other individuals, based on involvement with an organization that has
previously been declared criminal, but without establishing personal guilt.612 The High Court of
Australia has recently rejected a challenge that sought for the measure to be found incompatible
with fundamental rights of freedom of association.613 It is in fact well established that the right
to freedom of association is not an absolute right, the right is generally limited by legitimate
restrictions such as in the interest of national security or public safety; for the prevention of
disorder or crime; for the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.614 These restrictions need generally to be prescribed by law and be
necessary in a democratic society.615 Such legitimate restrictions can arguably provide a basis
for limiting freedom of association in cases of, organized, serious and violent criminal activity.
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Concerns for the incompatibility of some non-criminal justice responses with the right to
freedom of association have been raised in other jurisdictions as well.616 The Federal Court of
Canada has rejected this challenge on the basis that freedom of association under the Canadian
Charter does not protect criminal or violent activity.617 Moreover, the European Court of Human
Rights has on a number of occasions accepted limitations of rights and freedoms of the European
Convention of Human Rights for the legitimate aim of prevention of crime.618
Regarding fundamental principles of law, all the above issues can be said to raise
concerns for violation of established fundamental principles of the criminal law, were they to be
found applicable to the non-criminal justice responses, based on their punitive in fact nature,
reliance on criminal behaviour, etc.
Additionally, concerns have been raised for incompatibility of non-criminal justice
responses with the Rule of Law. In particular concerns have been raised with the incompatibility
with ‘legal certainty’ a fundamental principle of law embedded in the Rule of Law. Friedrich A
Hayek has elegantly described the principle of legal certainty:
“Stripped of technicalities this means that government in all its actions is
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules that make it possible to
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in
given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge.”619
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These concerns have been raised with for example the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders,
based on the insufficient definition of behaviour that could be considered anti-social for the
purpose of obtaining a court order.620 Consequently, the citizens is not able to anticipate with
fair certainty what kind of behaviour might be deemed anti-social for the purpose of the AntiSocial Behaviour Orders, and subsequently not sufficiently able to avoid acting in a way that
does not initiate the coercive powers of the authorities.
Furthermore, non-criminal justice responses that lack clear legal basis, raise concerns for
violating the Rule of Law and in particular the principle of legal certainty. Such clear legal basis
has been claimed to be lacking for some of the non-criminal justice responses utilized by
authorities in member states of the European Union.621
Finally, as previously noted, concerns for lack of due process in depriving individuals of
their liberty have been raised with the ‘bikie laws’ in Australia.622
As previously noted, Human Rights and the Rule of Law are stated to be amongst the
founding values of the Union in the Treaty on European Union.623 Admittedly, without an
access to the criteria for selection of the non-criminal justice responses to be promoted by the
Union or information about the responses being promoted, the compatibility of the promotion
with Human Rights and the Rule of Law in selection of responses to promote can not be
adequately examined.
However, the very secrecy that surrounds the promotion of non-criminal justice responses
by the European Union suggests lack of respect for the principle of legal certainty, and thereby
the Rule of Law. By concealing the non-criminal justice responses that the European Union is
appealing to its member states to adopt, the Union can be seen to limit the ability of its citizens to
foresee how authorities within the Union can be expected to use its coercive powers in given
620
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circumstances and thereby limiting their ability to plan their affairs based on that knowledge.624
Furthermore, request for access to the Hungarian handbook, previously mentioned compilation
of non-criminal justice responses promoted as best practice by the European Union, was denied
with arguments that seem to be incompatible with the principle of legal certainty.625 The General
Secretariat of the Council of The European Union emphasized the importance of keeping secret
the details of preventive measures and actions to counter organized crime, so individuals
involved in organized crime could not find possible weaknesses for furthering their activities.626
This is in turn argued to weaken the efforts of various law enforcement authorities to counter
organized crime in the interest of public security. These arguments seem not to be compatible
with the principle of legal certainty. However, it is unclear to what extent this response reflect
the emphasize placed in the Rule of Law by the European Union when it comes to utilization of
non-criminal justice responses.
Transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses seems therefore to raise no lesser
reasons for concern for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights
then has been claimed to be the case with the system of Transnational Criminal Law.627 Firstly,
transnational efforts for promoting the approach and specific responses seem to fail to emphasis
compatibility of approaches and responses with Human Rights and fundamental principles of
law. Secondly, concerns have to be raised over the very origin of domestic non-criminal justice
responses to criminal activity seems to have been to bypass procedural safeguards.628
Furthermore, as detailed above, this study shows that existing non-criminal justice responses,
utilized by domestic authorities to counter organized crime, raise concerns for incompatibility
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with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights.629 Finally, the policy documents
promoting non-criminal justice responses do not address the criticism that these kinds of
responses have met, nor does the policy clearly emphasize the importance of compatibility of
such responses with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights. In fact, the above
mentioned statements about the need to balance fundamental right and freedoms against efficient
law enforcement and prosecution, raise important concerns for the intentions of the Union to
honour fundamental right and freedoms in its efforts to counter organized crime.630
Consequently, concerns must be raised over compatibility of the promotion of non-criminal
justice responses with Human Rights and fundamental principles of law.

Knowledge as basis for Transnationalization of Non-Criminal
Justice Responses
The final part of the criteria is to examine the knowledge base for the transnationalization
of non-criminal justice responses.
The above examination shows the promotion by the European Union of non-criminal
justice responses for countering organized crime to raise concerns much in line with those raised
over the transnationalization of criminal justice responses under the system of Transnational
Criminal Law.631 Even more problematically, many of these issues have not been addressed in
the context of the promotion of non-criminal justice responses. This might suggest that those
developing and promoting non-criminal justice responses within the European Union were not
sufficiently knowledgeable about the issues that have previously been raised with the system of
Transnational Criminal Law. This in turn raises concerns for the knowledge base on which the
promotion and development of non-criminal justice responses rests. Resent studies into the
evidential basis of policymaking within the Area of Freedom Security and Justice suggest in fact

629

See this thesis examination of existing non-criminal justice responses, and concerns raised about compatibility
with Human Rights, p 65 – 103.
630
European Union, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Developing a strategic concept on tackling
organised crime’ (European Union, June 2, 2005), at p 2; The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A
European Union Strategy for the beginning of the new millennium [2000] OJ C124/1, at p 15.
631
Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953.

135

dependency on less than sound knowledge and lack of sound knowledge within the entire policy
field.632
Joanna Parkin criticized policy making within the European Union’s new Internal
Security Strategy for being based on questionable evidence.633 Her study shows the policy
making to be based mostly on what she chooses to call ‘agency generated knowledge’, generated
by Home Affairs agencies of the European Union. The study reveals why most of the
knowledge that these agencies are producing should not be considered knowledge, but rather
intelligence and why as such it should not be presented as grounds for evidence based decision
making.
Parkin’s study examined the agency generated knowledge and found it “. . . presents
several shortcomings when measured against criteria of objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability,
relevance and accuracy.”634 Methodology and information based on for this agency generated
knowledge were frequently not made available for critical review. Furthermore, the information
based on were frequently not gathered in accordance with any sound methodology, but provided
by law enforcement institutions of the member states on a voluntary basis.635 This is found to be
problematic for lack of mechanism to ensure consistency in the selection of information that the
research is to be based on, creating concerns for the objectivity and completeness of the
information.
Additionally, the ‘knowledge’ being produced is kept beyond scrutiny, such as scientific
assessment of the quality and reliability of the process or the information used.636 This limits the
field of expertise to the expertise that exists within the agencies. Consequently, the limited field
of expertise and lack of critical review was found to generate risk for gaps in the knowledge
base, unidentified flaws in the methodology or failure to identify relevant information or
alternative interpretations.
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Furthermore, the agencies of the European Union Home Affair claim to be a source of
knowledge in the field and in unique position to create Europe wide knowledge, when in fact
they are producing less than sound knowledge, and more in line with intelligence.637
Subsequently, Parkin’s study suggests that policymaking within the subject area of internal
security of the European Union is in fact largely based on intelligence portrayed as sound
knowledge. This is problematic for a number of reasons.
Intelligence is neither scientific knowledge, nor evidence. Intelligence has even been
described as an educated guess.638 Where the intelligence is the best guess of what has or will
happen based on some information but not necessarily based on evidence,639 while evidence are
necessarily subject to one or another standard of proof, generally excluding opinions and
guesswork. Intelligence differ from scientific research in that it is not intended to acquire
knowledge on a chosen subject.640 Rather it is intended to provide educated guess of “. . . what
has happened, is happening now, or could happen in the future”641, to direct the facilitation of
effective intervention.642 The analysis that create intelligence differ from research that create
sound scientific knowledge in a number of ways, such as intelligence’s need for speed, secrecy
and professional trust, as well as being expected to include bias and guesswork.643 While
scientific research capable of creating or contributing to sound knowledge is “. . . measured
against criteria of objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability, relevance and accuracy”644, as well as
having to pass critically reviewed by academic experts in the subject field before being accepted
for publication.645 Consequently, scientifically sound knowledge has to be able to state what
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information is the basis for its conclusions, and how the said conclusions were reached from the
information cited.
Finally, the agencies are found to rely predominantly on expert knowledge within the law
enforcement and security professions, both for the gathering of information and processing of
information, while independent academic research seems not to carry much weight.646 This last
point is found to generate three additional issues.
First, the ‘knowledge’ claimed to be created is generated in a closed circle of likeminded
experts with similar experience and expertise, having similar goals and interests, while criticism
based on related interests, goals and related experience or expertise is held at bay.647 Examples
of different interests, that might be necessary to given priority over efficient law enforcement
interventions, would be: Civil liberty, fundamental rights, and proportionality.648 Potentially
valuable complementary expertise can for example be drawn from the fields of: Global
governance, legal comparison, and different forms of social science casting light on the social
problem and the effects of the proposed responses on that said social problem and the society at
large.
Second, Parkin’s study finds intelligence to be circulated as knowledge in inter agency
cooperation, and to policy decision makers, while sheltered from outside scrutiny.649 This
creates the problem that “. . . intelligence as ‘knowledge’ is being circulated, re-packaged and recycled inside and between agencies, becoming self-reinforcing, yet increasingly separated from
its original evidence base.”650
Finally, the study identifies objectivity as a specific problem with creation of sound
knowledge within agencies which existence and role so heavily relies on the decisions made on
the basis of this same ‘knowledge’. The study finds agencies to be engaged with identifying
problems and developing solutions that ultimately have established or strengthened the role of
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the agencies themselves.651 This concerns for objectivity then escalates with the secrecy that
prevents public discussion and review of the ‘knowledge’ and how it is produced.
Parkin insightfully points out that “. . . the question of ‘what is knowledge’ is intimately
linked with the question of what constitutes objective evidence.”652 Consequently, by
introducing non-objective information as knowledge, such information can be mistaken for
objective evidence.
Parkin’s study raises concerns for the knowledge base for the promotion of non-criminal
justice responses by the European Union. As detailed in the chapter on transnational promotion
of non-criminal justice responses653, the European Union is actively involved in developing
specific responses and select best practices, practices that the Union then promotes amongst its
member states.654 The Union gets involved in this way, and is being called up on to do so by its
member states, based on its unique position to facilitate sharing of information amongst the
member states and ability of its supranational institution to create Union wide knowledge.655
The knowledge created, as well as best practices selected on basis of that knowledge, are referred
to in the legal instruments and policy documents created by the Union.656 Subsequently, this
creates legal obligations and soft law pressure for member states, to adopt the suggested policies,
approaches and responses - potentially affecting domestic policy and norms.
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Study of the publicly available documents about the selection and promotion of noncriminal justice responses at the level of the European Union shows Parkin’s concerns to be
relevant to the promotion of non-criminal justice responses.
First, the knowledge being generated at the level of the European Union about noncriminal justice responses as part of the Unions promotion of such responses seems to be
predominantly generated by expert practitioners in law enforcement.657 As pointed out by
Parkin, law enforcement agencies have been criticized for fostering an occupational culture that
might emphasize effective intervention over considerations criticizing or limiting such effective
law enforcement.658 This raises concerns for objectivity and impartiality of the knowledge
created.
Regarding the concerns raised by Parking about knowledge generated in a closed circle
of likeminded experts, the Europol Platform for Experts has experts from outside the circle of
law enforcement practitioners. However, available information does not reveal how extensive
expertise is to be found within the forums of the platform, what forums have experts external to
law enforcement agencies, and to what extent the platform influences the knowledge on which
the European Union bases its work.659 Secrecy clocking the knowledge generated and how it is
generated shelters from criticism and prevents external input.
The development of non-criminal justice responses at the level of the European Union
seems to be based on information offered on voluntary basis from the member states about
responses being or having been utilized by their domestic authorities.660 No independent
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collection of information seems to take place, nor review of the information shared by the
domestic expert practitioners. Additionally, concerns must be raised over the objectivity and
impartiality of experts within agencies that are being affected by the policy or responses
promoted.661 These concerns can best be objected to with transparency and review of the work
being conducted – unfortunately transparency is not part of the description of the process for the
assessment and promotion of non-criminal justice responses at the level of the European Union.
Similar concerns as Parkin raised about self-reinforcing of less than sound knowledge by
way of circulation between agencies of the European Union, must be raised over the Union’s role
in sharing information about non-criminal justice responses between the member states, as well
as collection, assessment and selection of best practice at the Union level.662 Concerns must be
raised for the involvement of the Union to cause to some extent separation between the
knowledge being shared and its original evidence basis. Additional, emphasize on less than
sound knowledge and lack of truly sound knowledge, may raise concerns for undue influence of
the European Union, based on its own policy and interests of its agencies, on the information
shared and the responses selected as best practices.
Finally, Parkin identifies objectivity as a specific problem for creation of sound
knowledge within agencies, which existence and role relies so heavily on the decisions made on
the basis of the knowledge being generated.663 Such concerns for objectivity must, also, be
raised over the knowledge about non-criminal justice response generated by national and
supranational agencies that have, or are intended to play a role in countering organized crime or
crime in general by utilizing non-criminal justice responses.664 Additionally, different nation
states seem to have different level of involvement in the knowledge generation. For example,
the Hungarian handbook was created primarily by representatives of eight of the then 27 member
661
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states of the European Union.665 These concerns for objectivity then escalates with the secrecy
that prevents public discussion and review of the knowledge and how it is generated.
Furthermore, as noted by Parkin, knowledge is considered to represent objective evidence.
Consequently, it seems misleading to represent non-objective information as knowledge.
Parkin points out how the Home Affair agencies are trying to establish themselves as “. . .
‘centres of expertise’ or ‘law enforcement knowledge bases’.”666 The same seems to be the case
with transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses, the European Union and its
supranational institutions are trying to establish themselves as a basis for knowledge in the field,
while at the same time ignoring established ideas about how sound knowledge is produced.
Unfortunately, no attempts seem to have been made to establish why sound knowledge should be
differently produced in the field of law enforcement than in other fields. Even if reference has
been made to the importance of intelligence over scientific research, based on need for speed,
secrecy and professional trust.667 Unfortunately, secrecy and professional trust has frequently
been misused and the need for prompt results seems not to be the only consideration for policies
that have been developing for tens of years. Too much dependency of police on intelligence has
been criticized.668 Established principles for generation of scientifically sound knowledge and
evidence seem therefore not to have been altered, objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability,
relevance, accuracy, and critical review seem still to be at the heart of the creation of sound
knowledge.669
The European Union’s contribution to the selection of existing non-criminal justice
responses and development of new responses seems therefore to run into the same criticism, for
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lacking knowledge base and being based on less than sound knowledge, as the Union’s policy
making in the field.
Knowledge of non-criminal justice responses seems to be lacking and the knowledge
relied on seems to be less than sound knowledge. Still the Union is appealing to its member
states to adopt responses based on this work. Furthermore, the member states of the Union are
seeking increased involvement of the European Union, and agencies of the Union are seeking to
play a role in the promotion of non-criminal justice response. This reliance of the member states
on the Union is likely caused by the claim of the European Union Home Affairs agencies to be in
a unique position to create superior knowledge in this field due to their Union wide overview and
access to information. Truly, the Union and its institutions are in a unique position to create
superior knowledge, but this study indicates that this position is not utilized to generate
objective, evidence based, and sound knowledge.
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The elephant in the room: international promotion of noncriminal justice responses to organized crime – raises
substantive and relevant concerns
This study claims to have confirmed its presumption that domestic authorities are
utilizing great variety of non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime, and greater
than existing academic literature suggests. Additionally, the utilization of this approach seems to
be more vide spread worldwide than the literature indicates. The research shows domestic
authorities in Australia, Canada, Iceland, and most or all of the member states of the European
Union to be utilizing non-criminal justice responses.670 In fact, non-criminal justice responses
have become a major complementary approach for countering organized crime, and there seems
to be reasons to think this approach is on the rise. However, existing literature on domestic noncriminal justice responses raises numerous concerns with both individual responses and the
approach of utilizing non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime and crime in
general. These concerns have mainly to do with compatibility of the non-criminal justice
responses with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights, as well as lack of restrain on
the scope of the responses, to some extent due to difficulty with providing sufficient definition
for the subject of the response.
Furthermore, the study found the European Union to utilize International Soft Law for the
promotion of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime, both the approach as such and
specific responses as best practice. Consequently, rejected its second presupposition, that noncriminal justice responses to organized crime were not part of international efforts for countering
transnational crime, including organized crime. The soft law approach is found to create legal
obligations as well as pear pressure, effectively influencing the member states to adopt noncriminal justice responses as a complementary approach to traditional criminal justice responses.
Additionally, the Union can be seen to promote the utilization of non-criminal justice responses
by facilitating information sharing between the member states, assessment and selection of best
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practices from existing practices and experience of its member states, and by contributing to the
development of new and existing responses.
Surprisingly, no academic literature was found that discussed specifically this promotion
of the European Union of non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime, and
little or no scientific research seems to have been conducted on this aspect of globalization of
crime control under International Law. Transnational Criminal Law, claiming to be the main
venue within the field of law for academic discussion about international efforts for indirectly
suppressing organized crime through domestic law, seems to continue to exclude non-criminal
justice responses and the effects of International Soft Law on domestic legislation.
Consequently, much of the influence that International Soft Law and information sharing at the
level of the European Union seems to have on domestic authorities adopting non-criminal justice
responses for countering organized crime, goes largely unnoticed by the academic discussion
about international efforts for countering organized crime.
These considerations seem to be of an importance as the examination conducted as part
of this study shows the promotion by the European Union of non-criminal justice response to
organized crime to raise concerns for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and
good governance. In fact the examination shows the promotion by the Union to raise concerns
much in line with those that have previously been raised over the system of Transnational
Criminal Law. This study argues these concerns to be caused by a combination of lack of sound
knowledge and lack of emphasize on fundamental principles of law, Human Rights and good
governance. The concern for lack of sound knowledge is base on academic researches finding
lack of reliance on sound knowledge within the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice. Additionally, showing reliance on less than sound knowledge and intelligence,
misconceived as sound knowledge.

Based on findings of lack of knowledge and incompatibility of the international
promotion of non-criminal justice responses with fundamental principles of law, Human Rights
and good governance, detailed in previous chapter, this study suggests pluralist thinking as a
favourable approach to international efforts for countering organized crime.
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The pluralist perspective suggested there to be real problems, both theoretically and
practically, with creation of universal hierarchical normative order at the global or even regional
level due to the diversity of the world’s societies.671 This is in line with academic writings in the
field of Transnational Criminal Law that suggest harmonization of organized crime legislation to
be a goal that would be hard to reach, due to the variety of social problems perceived to be
organized crime, the diversity of organized crime legislations and lack of consensus amongst
nation state about what kind of activities should be seen to constitute organized
crime.672Academic discussions, although predominantly within the pluralistic school of thought,
seem therefore to suggest that not only are domestic responses to counter organized crime
designed to counter the particular social problem perceived to be organized crime in that
particular jurisdiction, they are designed to work in a specific domestic social, economic and
legal contexts. Pluralist legal thinking seems therefore to suggest that transnational
harmonization is not the way ahead for international efforts to counter organized crime, in a
“pluralistic-in-fact universe”673 where “every legal system has its own society”674.
Finally, this study finds the European Union to be facilitating information sharing
between its member states and influencing the development of non-criminal justice responses
based on existing domestic practices and experience.
Existing academic writings suggest, however, that using practices and experience from
one nation state to develop responses in another nation state, is a difficult and complicated
process. Writing on pluralist legal thinking and legal comparison Zumbanse emphasizes the
need for “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons”675, in the appropriate
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context.676 Consequently, an ‘interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons’ of
the existing practices and experience needs to be reached, in their ‘appropriate context’ of both
jurisdictions.677 Subsequently, it should be possible to identify relevant similarities and
differences, making it possible to see if and how one jurisdiction can draw from the other’s
practices and experience.
Furthermore, the discussion suggests it to be scientifically flawed to promote the
practices and experience from one jurisdiction as best practices, to be adopted by other
jurisdictions, only based on assessment of the practices and experiences in that jurisdiction.
Arguing that the implementation of the same practices in different jurisdiction may yield
completely different experience, based on the domestic context. The European Union is found to
be promoting best practices, seemingly based only on assessment of existing practices and
experience in their jurisdiction of origin, encouraging its member states to adopt specific noncriminal justice responses.
Substantive concerns are therefore raised over the information sharing of existing
practices and experience of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime, and promotion of
best practices within the European Union.
This study claims to raise considerable and relevant concerns with current international
efforts for the promotion of non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime. Not
because the utilization of non-criminal justice responses can not be a good approach to organized
crime or criminal activities in general, but because the promotion of the approach and specific
responses fails to rely on best available knowledge in the field and seems tainted by less than
sound knowledge and lack of emphasize on Human Rights, fundamental principles of law and
good governance.
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Concluding Remarks
This thesis has been much critical on the current international efforts for the promotion of
non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime. However, this is not to say that
the approach to counter organized crime by utilizing non-criminal justice responses can not be a
good approach – only that current international efforts for promoting the approach raise concerns
and deserve criticism.
This study has shown how practitioners are increasingly reaching out for non-criminal
justice responses to counter organized crime. The main argument for the adoption of noncriminal justice responses seem to be that traditional criminal justice responses have proved to be
insufficient in dealing with transnational and organized crime. This is in fact supported by
academics that have argued traditional criminal justice responses to be neither well suited to deal
with collective behaviour such as organized crime, nor criminal activities that transcends borders
such as transnational crime. Additionally, development of criminal justice responses aimed at
organized crime have meet criticism for unacceptably widening the scope of criminal liability,
lacking the establishment of the fault requirement and bordering on guilt by association.
Consequently, the development of non-criminal justice responses, for the purposes of prevention
and deterrence, seems not that far fetched or unreasonable complementary approach to the
traditional criminal justice response, seemingly struggling in this field. However, existing
practices and experience have raised concerns, and some responses have even been found
unconstitutional in their jurisdiction of origin. Furthermore, it is found to be unsettling how the
introduction of non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime seem to raise concerns
that have been previously raised, either in another jurisdiction or in another context, such as the
context of criminal justice responses for countering organized crime. Consequently, suggesting
that the issue should have been addressed and potentially avoided in one way or another before
implementation of the response – if the preparation and development of the responses were based
on best available knowledge in the field.
These findings are not detrimental to the approach of utilizing non-criminal justice
responses to organized crime – there are, however, concerns and issues that need to be addressed.
Unfortunately, the policy documents and legal instruments, promoting non-criminal justice
responses to organized crime within the European Union, were not found to discuss or even note
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the issues and concerns raised with existing practices and experience. This in turn raises
concerns for the international promotion of the approach not being guided by best available
knowledge in the field. Consequently, it must be questioned if political assessment and decision
making to promote the approach was based on sound knowledge.
Furthermore, the study raises substantive concerns for the existing international
promotion of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime. Examination of the promotion
raises substantive concerns with compatibility of the promotion with fundamental principles of
law, human rights and good governance. It is unsettling that the examination was based on well
known concerns and issues that should have been considered and addressed in such an important
policy change as is the shift towards non-criminal justice approach to criminal activity,
traditionally dealt with by way of criminal justice responses. Subsequently, raising again the
concern for lack of sound knowledge in guiding the examination and promotion of non-criminal
justice responses at the international level.
Finally, this study found research based evidence for the lack of reliance on sound
knowledge in the policymaking and within institutions of the European Union’s Aria of Freedom,
Security and Justice. These evidence seem to be reinforce by findings of this study, that best
available knowledge is not sufficiently guiding the international efforts for promotion of noncriminal justice responses, selection of best practices and development of new responses. In fact,
the development and utilization of non-criminal justice responses seems to be lead by sharing of
raw information and intelligence, rather than sound knowledge. Emphasize on intelligence in
policing and for policymaking seems to have generated a widespread misconception of
intelligence as a sound knowledge – causing intelligence to be extensively presented as best
available knowledge.
Consequently, the promotion of the approach and existing practices seem repeatedly to
raise known issues, apparently without existing knowledge being utilized to avoid those issues
and develop legitimate and less contested practices. This study does not find against the
international promotion of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime in general – it does,
however, finding existing efforts to ignore best available knowledge in the field and
subsequently run into known issues.
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The main conclusion of this thesis is, therefore, that sound knowledge is lacking about
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime and that existing best available
knowledge in the field is not relied up on.
This lack of reliance on best available knowledge seems to be caused by a culture of
reliance on intelligence amongst policymakers, law enforcement and security personals. This
culture leads to misconception of intelligence as sound knowledge and reliance on intelligence
style analyzed and assessments for decision making. As intelligence is neither knowledge nor
evidence, this leads to decision making that runs into known issues and concerns. While
evidence based decision making based on best available knowledge should be capable of
identifying potential issues and concerns, in order to address them in a way that would avoid the
issues or justify the approach taken.
Consequently, public discussion is needed about the present shift from traditional
approach of countering crime with criminal justice responses, towards utilizing non-criminal
justice responses for countering criminal activities, such as organized crime, and the problematic
international promotion of the approach. The lack of reliance on sound knowledge and
overreliance on less than sound knowledge must be exposed. Hopefully, such public discussion
can lead to public and political pressure, capable of leading to policy and practices in the field
become more compatible with fundamental principles of law, human right, good governance and
the best available knowledge.
Such knowledge based development of non-criminal justice responses to criminal
activities such as organized crime would do well to learn from knowledge in the field of
Transnational Criminal Law and Global Governance, showing the problems with realization of
universal norms and the potentials of more pluralistic approach. Pluralist legal thinking might
then guide the sharing of information about practices and experience of domestic non-criminal
justice responses, based on sound knowledge, preferably realized by “interdisciplinary
understanding of functionalist comparisons”678, in the appropriate context.679 Potentially such
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development would be capable of furthering the development of domestic non-criminal justice
responses that would fit the perceived problem and the context of its own jurisdiction. Capable
of bringing about responses that are effective in countering the perceived problem, while
compatible with fundamental principles of law, Human Rights and good governance. After all,
being tough on crime is not ‘cool’ if you end up loosing in court – found yourself to have violated
fundamental principles of the society you thought you were serving and protecting.
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